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I.

THE NEED FOR PRESERVATION

A.

IJuroduetio'n

This paper will examine the different legislative
schemes that have been oreated in New England for the
proteot ion of ooastal wetlands '.

It will assess how

they have worked in praotioe, both with respeot to their
administration and the judioial response to them, and
will outline the arguments for and against upholding
restriotions on the use of wetlands under the legislation.
Coastal wetlands legislation in New England,l in
general, creates a permit system whereby anyone wishing
to change the existing state of a wetland must apply
to the proper authorities for permission to oarry out
the proposed activity.

Although there is some provision

for applioable state agencies to desi.gnate areaS as
wetlands, thus restricting their use before any permit
is requested, the legislation disoussed here does not
really focus on oreating any planning mechanism to
balance all the interests invo'lved and ensure that
wetlands are used properly.

'Of course, in deciding

whether to grant a permit or not, the regulatory body
Should take into account the competing uses for the
land involved and the spillover effects of the proposed
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activity, but the general thrust of the legislative
concern expressed in the statutes is preservation.
For unlike other parts of the coastal zone, wetlands,
once destroyed', cannot be recreat,ed.

They are unique

l

natural phenomena, formed over many, many years like
other parts of the coastal zone.

Whil,e a motel built

on a scenic headland may be torn down and a park created
in its place, once a wetland has been filled or dredged,
there is little that can be done to restore the delicate,
natural balance between land and, water, the particular
salinity, temperature, and transparency of the salt
and fresh water, the specific circulation pattern,
flushing time, turbulence and stream inflow that characterize
any productive wetland. 2
When increasing public conc,ern for the coastal
z.on,e so often focuses on the more visible aspects- of
oil pollution, land development and over.crowded recreational facilities,) and on the general need for overall
planning,4 it might be wondered Why wetlands, in particular,
have been the subject of protective legislation and
of this study.

What are commonly thought to be just

"swamps" are not considered very useful for recreation,
housing or other forms of economic development in their
natural state.

Until recently they were thought fit

only for filling.

But, the fact is, as any informed
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citizen must now recognize, wetlands are very valuable
to all of us for a variety of reasons that will be
outlined below. S It is because tbeir importance, uniqueness
and vulnerability have been increasingly recognized
that wetlands have been protected in all i1 ve, coastal
New England stat,es, whereas other areas of concern
in the coastal zone have not yet received full legislative
attention.

Because there has'be'en enough time for

some litigation over
and

becau~e

~his

legislation to be decided,

the administrative procedures have had

a chance to be refined, it is now

p~ssible

to make

an analysis of the effectiveness of this wetlands
tion.

legisla~

Since wetlands are but one, albeit important,

part of the whole coastal zone. what we can learn from
the attempts to control their development may be useful
ae we turn 'to devising wider controls.

Much more of

the New England coastal zone than wetlands needs to
be protected from the ravages of uncontrolled human
development if it is to survive into the twenty-first
century, able to play the same vital commercial,

recreation~

al and ecological role that it has in the last three
hundred years.
New England is a good area to study because of
its leadership in the field and its regional character.
Massachusetts waS the first state to pass a wetlands
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law,6 and New England was the first multistate region
in the country to be protected by legislation in this
area.

Thus, there are five legislative schemes to

examine, different in detail, yet basically similar.
New England already exists as a recognized regional
unit, with functioning, regional governmental institutions.?
Although the need for and the problems with regional
government cannot be discussed in any detail in this
paper, preservation of the coastal zone, just as any
other pollution problem, is no respecter of governmental
boundaries.

The complex interrelatedness of the ecologi-

cal factors involved, which in turn influence commerce
and recreation, transcend state lines.

Maine's problem

is New Hampshire's, and so on down the coast.

Just

as the New England states have borrowed from each
other in tackling wetland preservation, so they may
learn from each other's experiences in regulating
wetlands how to attack the much more complex task
of regulating the whole coastal z,one.

B.

What are wetlands qDd why are they important?

"Wetlands" is, used in this paper as a comprehensive
term to cover the areas designed to be protected by

-5'"

the various pieces of legislati,on.

But the differences

in the actual legislative definitions are significant.
Th.ey indicate, differences in attitude towards what
it is that should be preserved, and of course they
delineate the extent of administrative control.

As

we shall see shortly,8certain types of wetlands, particularly salt marshes, are extremely prOductive areas.
Rhode Island s definition covers only t'hose areas as
I

well as "such uplands contiguouS' thereto, but extending
no more than fifty (50) yards inland therefrom, as
the director [of the Department of Natural Resources]
shall deem reasonably necessary to protect such salt
marshes..
,.9 It, along with Connecticut lO and New
Hampshire,ll shows some sophistication in scientific
understanding by including in its definition a list
of vegetation--various grasses for the most part--that
is capable of growing on the land intended to be included. 12

But Connecticut and New HampShire do not just include
salt marshes. Along with Maine l ) and Massachusetts,14
whOSe definitions do not have th·e same scientific content,
their legislation covers all areas bordering tidal
waters.

Thus, with the exception of Rhode Island,

the New England

s~ates

seek not only to preserve productive

wetlands, i.. e •• salt marshes, but also beaches " ledges,
flats, or any other parts of the shore from uncontrolled
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change or development. 15
However

~hey ar~

described, it is only recently

that the general pUblic has begun to app:I"leciate the
importance of wetlands remaining in their natural state.
Their appeal to the developer has been obvious for
some time.

They are unused, and thus probably cheap,

pieces of land that can be filled in to create often
choice sites for residential or commercial development.
Perhaps, .like so many of th.is country!s naturally abundant
resources, their value' has been recognized to some
degree, but because of their vast extent they have
never been thought to need protection.

But .as the

rate of their destruction has become increasingly apparent,
as the absolute number of wetlands has decreased, and
as scientists have come to understand more fully the
complexi ty and interrelated quality of our world" s
natural environment, people have looked more carefully
at the function and uses of wetlands.
Accurate figures of the rate of destruction are
impossible to obtain, because of the differences in
definitio'n, but oonservative e·stimates are that the nation
lost more than 25% of its wetlands - over two million
acres - in the 32 years between 1932 and 1954r
setts has lost about 20% over its history.

W~ssachu

Connecticut

lost over 12% between 1954 and 1964, while the other
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New England. states have lost between 1% and 5% in that

time .16

These figures, however, do not include the

of productive wetlands from pollution.

IQsS,

One indication

of the combined effects of pollution and the filling of
wetlands on shellfish alone is that while Connecticut
averaged a ,shellfish harvest of 2,0 million dollars per
year between 1920 and 1960, it onl,y averaged 1.5 million
dollars between 1955 and 1971. 17
The scientific evidence is indisputable that
wetlands

per~orm

many invaluable services for mankind.

First, they provide nutrients for a host of marine
and land based species - fish, shellfish, animals and
birds.

Wetlands are among the most productive areas

on earth, producing about 10 tons of organic matter,
chiefly grasses, per acre, per year, compared with
the world's best Wheat fields' 7 tons, a hay field's

4 tons, and the coastal waters' 1 to 1.5 tons.

As

one scientist has described its
Estuaries in general and salt marshes in
particular are unusually productive places.
None of the commercial agriculture, except
possibly rice and sugar cane production, comes
close to producing as much potential animal
food as do the salt marshes,

The agricultural

crops Which approach this high figure are
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ferti.lized and cultivated! at great expense.
The marsh is fertilized and cultivated only
by the. tides. 18
The complex. process by which this vegetation is broken
down into substances usable by the smallest marine
organisms, which in turn provide food for larger species
by means of their excretions., is both delicate. and
crucial to the continued existence of some two-thirds
of the annual commercial fishing harvest of the east
coast of the United States. 19

Obviously it is difficult

to reach any firm oonclusions on the monetary value
of individual wetlands, but the Maine· Department of
Environmental Protection cites the following values
for average yields per acre in 19731

sea moss - $3200,

soft-shelled clams - $1885, hard-shelled clams - $14,680,
shrimp - $2137, and marine worms - $8680. 20 As one
commentator has pointed out, the average value of
wetlands in Maine is more than the average' value of
21
land.
While the economic importance of wetlands is
perhaps most easily seen when related to fishing both commercial and recreationa1 22 - wetlands also are
major habitats for a wide variety of species of animals

and birds, thus helping to provid"e the variety in nature

that is thought to be beneficial for the control of

pests

Wetlands play an important role in coastal

y

flood control and i'n preventing the erosion. of land by
acting as buffers to the sea pounding against the shore,
dispersing the

sea~s

power among a m¥Taid of channels and

preventing one section of land from taking the full brunt
of the water' s force.

Wet,lands damaged by storms can

rebuild themselves naturally while man-made struetures
cannot.
by

Wetlands help reduce the silting of estuaries

taking in large amounts of sediment from the sea.

The

same bacteria that break down the vegetation and the
excretions of the lower marine organisms also serve as
water purifiers.

They break down the discnarge of

secondary s,ewerage treatment plants and thus help to
alleviate pollution.

In supporting vegetation that Can

grow in saline conditions, which occur on land in many
places of the world, wetlands may also prove to be a
source of food in the future. 2 )
Finally, wetlands provide a unique open space

that serves, not only as a living laboratory for scientists, but as a general recreational f,acility f'or us
all.

It is increasingly important that we leave areas

of this shrinking planet alone, not only to provide their
rich variety of foods and habitats to a host of Wildlife,
but also to give us places where we can experience a
sense of ease and renewa.l by interacting With the natural
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life that goes on, so often unseen, all around our controlled and mechanized environment.

-li ...

II.

A.

!h§

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Eyolui~Qn

Qf' the Pre§eni Legislation

~d

Legislative Findings
While all the states now have legislation setting
forth the scientific, cQmmercial

O~

recreational value

of wetlands, at least implicitly, this recognition has
only occurred within the last decade or so as the realization
Qf the importance of wetlands has grown.

Massachusetts

passed its permit scheme fQr dredging or filling wetlands
in 1963,24 and the stat-ute prQviding for the pr.otection
of wetlands by administrative orders of the Department
of Natural Resources 25 in 1965_ Rhode Island set up a
s,imilar permit sy,stem26 and mad~ it a cttIilinal offense
to disturb wetlan~s without a permit 27 in that same
year.

Maine and New Hampshire passed their permit schemes 28

in 1967.

Connecticut had regulated the removal of sand
and gravel from tidal waters 29 before' 196) and in that
year added legislation. regulating the erection of structure.s within tidal waters. 30 In 1969, it set up a permit
system to regulate dredging and filling, declaring
"that the remaining wetlands of this state are all
in j·e,opardy of being lost or despoiled by these and
other activities. uJ1
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The expressions of legislative concern include
constitutional provisions in Massachusetts and Rhode
Island relating to the environment in general. J2 In
Rhode Island explicit reference is made in the wetlands
statute 3; to the state's constitutional guarantee of
"the free right of fishery,"
a clea_r

and

'and

the statute contains

detcailed statement of the correlation between

productivity of wetlands and the well-being of

t~e

the fishing indus,try and of the value of wetlands as
flood control devices.

Connecticut's wetland statute,3 4,

and New Hampshire's.J5 which followed Connecticut's
by

one year and contains much of the same language,

are equally as sophisticated in their comprehension
of the important role of wetlands. The older Maine 36
and Massachusetts statutes J ? contain no such explicit
reference to the valuable functions of wetlands.
that i.s not to say that those states have not

But

recogni~ed

in other ways the crucial importance ,of preserving
the environment in general,
amendment has been mentioned.

Massachusetts' constitutional
Maine" aside from a

strict site deve~opment act J8 and a mandatory shoreland
zoning act,39 also has a strong oil discharge prevention
and pollution control act with legislative findings
that
the highest and best uses of the
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seacoast of the state are as a sQurce
of

pUb~ic

and private recreation • • .

public use and private commerce in
fis~ing,

lobstering and gathering

other marine life •... [and] that the
preservation of these uses is a matter
of the highest urgency and priority •••• 40
More recently, Connecticut and Massachusetts
have passed legislation requiring environmental impact
statements for certain projects that may affect wetlands.
Connecticut· s Environmental Policy Act 41 r,equires only
state agencies to submit written statements of the impact
of their activities on the environment, and thus only has
relevance to the protection of wetlands if a state agency,
suCh as the highway department,
fill.

pr~poses

to dredge or

It may be important, however, because its broad

statement of the need to preserve the natural environment
and of the responsibility of the state, as trustee for
the environment, adds to the general legislative finding
of the need for preservation.
The Massachusetts environmental impact statute,42
first passed in 1972, has significantly broader ,requirements.

As of 1974 it, covers all private activities that

affect natural environmental resources and requires, not
only a statement of the impact of the proposed activity,
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but also a discussion of proposed mitigating measures.
It does not contain a strong, general statement, however,
of legislative concern for the preservation of the
natur.al 19nvir·onment.

In none of its legislation concerning

wetlands does Massachusetts have more, than a simple
statement that it will regulate them "for the purpose
of promoting pUblic safety, health and welfare, and
protecting public and private property, wildlife and
marine fisherieso.,4J
This omission may have significance for the
argument that permit

denia~s

or restrictions are police

power regulations and not takings requiring compensation.
The stronger the statement of the legislative purpos.e in
restricting the use of wetlands is, the more successful
the argument may be.

The more the legislature indicates

that it has carefully weighed the !l-eed for the preservation
of wet.lands, and thus the need for regulation, and has
found it more important to the public interest than the
uncontrolled right of a property owner to change the
nature of his land, thus causing harm to the environment,
the readier the courts may be to accept that conclusion.
The other states, too, should move to require environmental impact statements for significant public and
private projects, for then it will be clearer to everyone
What the true costs of a project will be.

The hitherto
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unmeasured costs borne by the public will be exposed

for the administrative and jUdicial bodies to see and
weigh.

B.

Regulated

Actiyit~es

The most generally recognized danger to the preservation of wetlands is uncontrolled dredging

or filling. 44

All five states have prohibitions against such activity

without a permit. 45

It is the mos,t destructive form

of alteration and the easiest one for developers to
use to maximize the development potential of the property.
Only Massachusetts and Maine specifically prohibit
46 .
pollution in their wetlands statutes.,
although that

danger is also substantial anQ While less permanent
perhaps" can have severe effects on the producti vi ty
of a wetland.

Connecticut regulates "str,eam channel

encroachments," such as piers, for "the protection
and preservation of the natural resources and ecosyste'ms
of the state, including •. , annual plant, and acquatio
life, [and] nutrient ex-change ... 47

Rhode Island gives

Director of the Department of Natural Resources
discre~ion as to what activities to restri¢t. 48

~he
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c.
1.

~~rmit

App11cation Procedures

State Versus Local Authority
All five states have much the Same basic administrative

pattern for issuing dredge or fill permits.

Perhaps the
key difference is in how much authority municipalities 49
are given.

Connecticut and Rhode Is,land give full
authority to the state bOdy.5 0 New Hampshire gives

a municipality an opportunity to delay the Water Resources
Board's5 1 public hearing for no more than )0 days for
a local investigation of the issue,5 2 While if~ine gives
the municipality the initial decision making responsibility
but requires the Board of Environmental Protection 5;
to approve ~ny issuance of a permit. 54 Massachusetts
leaves the decision to the municipality with a right
of appeal to the state Department of Natural Resources. 55

Leaving the decision on whether or not to grant
permits to the municipality would seem to invite the
weakening of any state policy to preserve wetlands.
It is precisely because there has been no, general awareness

of the unique value of wetlands that the various state
legislature.s have attempted "to regulate the dredging
and filling of them.

Individual communities, continually

pressured by the need to' increase tax rolls, and restricted
by their understandable concern for their own area
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from seeing the needs of the state as a whole, cannot

be expected to advance the cause of wetlands preservation
at, their own expense ..
On the other hand, the restriction of community
participation to testifying at the public hearing,
as is the case in Connecticut and Rhode Island, raises
serious questions about whether

i~

is wise to let the

state have complete authority over the regulation of
lOcal reseurces.

As the extent of' state regulation

of the coastal zone increases, local concern will be
an ever growing reality.

There has been a particularly

strong history of local participation in conservation
matters in New England.

Beginning with Massachusetts

in 1957, all the states, except Maine, have statutes
allowing municipalities to set up conservation commissions. 56 Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire give
the conservation commission, if it exists, an important
role in the permit system procedure, 57 and in all the
states 'municipalities are presumably allowed to set
up their own stricter c0ntrols. 58
Regional planning commissions may be the best

way to retain local input and yet avoid parochialism,.
but they are not yet v.ery developed in N,ew England.

Maine's statute requires the agreement of both the
municipality and the Board of Environmental Protection
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for approval of a permit and gives each a veto power. 59
This solution neither allows a municipality to sabotage
easily the state's poliey of preservation nor prevents
it from active part'icipation in the regulation of

its resources.

But it does mean that there ar'e wasteful,

and to the applicant often frustrat.ing, delays and
In general the l'egislative schemes

duplication.

have tended to bypass whatever loeal control already
existed, creating a second tier of permits. 60

a system has two major, bureaucratic evilsJ

Such
wasteful

duplication and central control with little local
participation.

This area is clearly one to which

legislature, local authorities and conservationists
will have to give more thought.

2.

Submi~sion

of the Application

The permit applications go to the· following
officials:

Connecticut - Commissioner of the Department

of Environmental Protectionl Maine - Board of Environmental 'Protection, municipality; Massachusetts - municipal

conservation commission, Department of Natural Resources,
Department of Public Works; New Hampshire

~

Water Resources

Board, town clerk; Rhode IsLand - Director of the
M~
t
of NattU'al Resources, Coasta 1 Resources
'l'lGlInaeemen

Depart~ent

. 1 61

Counc·~_.-
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The statutory requirements for the content of
these applications vary only

s~ightly.

All the states

require the submission of plans, but only

~~ssachusetts

requires the desirable addition of a statement of the
effeots on the environment of the proposed activity.
!t also provides that the conservation commission,
upon the request of anyone, will make a written decision
as to whether a particular piece of land or a project
comes under the permit requirements.

Only Connecticut

requires that the application contain the names of
adjacent landowners and claimants
to th.e applicant and that the

o~

water rights known

app~ication

be available

to the public at the office of the Commissioner of
the Department of Environmental Protection.

Both items

are highly desirable for efficiency and fairness.
The former helps to ensure that all interested parties
ar-e later notified of any public hearing on the application
by

easing the administrative burden of the Department

of Environmental Protection, and the latter gives the
interested public an opportunity to learn o,f the detaIls
of proposals and thus prepare for hearings.

Maine

and New Hampshire require that the application be ,filed
60 and )0 days. respectively, before any work commences
,on the proposed activity,62 whereas the other states
unequivocably prohibit dredging or filling without a permit.
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J.

PUbliq Hearings

All the states require a public hearing in connection
with applications. 63 In Maine and Massachusetts the hearing is held by the municipality,64 in the other states
by

the state agency receiving the application.

Maine

and New Hampshire require the hearing to be held within
thirty days of receipt of the application,65 Vassachusetts
within twenty-one, Connecticut between thirty and sixty

days.66

Rhode Island has no time requirement.
The requirements for giving notice of these hear-

ings vary more widely.

Surprisingly, Connecticut and Mass-

achusetts are the only states that require notice to be
given at least a certain period of time before the hearing,
and Mass achus ett s only r,equire s fi ve days.

AI~

state s

require notice of the hearing to go to some of the following. the applicant. 6 ? either the municipality or the
s t a t e agency

··1
pr~marl

"
1 ve,
d 68 wh"10h ever one
. not
y ~nvo
~s

holding the hearing; abutting owners, and sometimes other
claimants of rights I 69 other selected state agencie's; 70
and newspapers. 71
for

any

There would seem to be little r,eason

of the states to exclude any of these parties.
None of the statutes give any details as to how

the hearings must be run.

In Maine they are, informal

affairs with the state represented only at some by
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the local coastal warden, who at most has little scientific

ex,perience to' offer.

If the state Board of Environmental

Protecti~n holds a hearing,7 2 that will be a more formal
proceeding, governed by the detailed departmental
regulations.?J

4.

The Decision
Only Maine and Massachusetts specify that a decision

must be made within a certain period of time. 74

Since

Maine requires approval of both the Board of Environmental Protection and the municipality, the municipality
is required to inform the Board of its decision within

7 days of the hearing, and the permit must be issued
or denied within )0 days of the hearing.

1n Massachusetts

the municipality has 21 days to decide Whether to
impose conditions on the activity proposed.
The allowable grounds for an adverse decision,
where they are specifically set out, follow the general,

legislative purposes of the particular statute. 75

Connec~

ticut adds to the usual ecological and flood control
purposes that a permit may be denied if the Department of
,Environmental Protectton is in the process of acquiring
the land in question.

Maine and New Hampshire allOW such

denials if the proposed activity would uadversely affect
the value

~r

enjoyment of the property of abutting

owners~."
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or "infringe on the property of abutting owners," 76
respectively.

As the court decisions indicate,?7 denials

must be specifically related to the concerns expressed
by the legislatures if they are to be upheld.
for making that relationship as

t~ght

The burden

as possible lies

of course on the administrative agency.

The statutory

language properly leaves them considerable discretion.

5.

Permit Conditions
The extent to which conditions may be imposed

on the issuance of a permit is important.

All the states,

at least implicitly, allow a wide discretion in imposing
conditions. 78 If conditions can be imposed and enforced,
many proposed activities may be modified so as not to
conflict with legislative concerns for fisheries, wildlife
and flood control.

It is only by reasonable accommQdatioQ

that the coastal zone, including wetlands, can be put to
best use for all the interests concerned.

Industry and

change are inevitable, .and insofar as they are planned
for and controlled, desirable.

Much depends upon the

sensitivity of the decision makers to both ecological and
development factors.

Blanket denials o,f permits because

of a strict construction of the legislative purpose, with
disregard for the possibility of reasonable conditions,
will only cause the courts to invalidate such aations as
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unreasonable restrictions on the use of property, thus
preventing what was meant to be achieved - the preservation

or

wetlands.
As it is clear that either the issuance or denial

of a permit can have important consequences for the
owner of the land involved, it is proper to require
that prospective buyers and other interested persons
should be put on notice of the administrative decision.
Yet only Maine requires the registration of such orders. 79
Massachusetts and New Hampshire require that a copy
of a permit be posted on the land,80 but that provision
is presumably to aid only law enforcement officers.

Maine has another unique provision that is highly
desirable and should be imitated.

The statute specifies
that all permits expire after three years. 81 In most
cases of dredging or filling the work will be done within
three years, but if any project is delayed it would be,
wise to take another look at it in light of changed
conditions, both locally and regionally.

~he

premises

on which the original decision was made may no longer
be sound.

If the project is a long term one and at the

end of three years a large investment has been made in
it, however, it will probably not be in the public
interest to stop it.
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6.

Enforcement
Every state has a fine for violations of the basic

sta~ute

prohibiting dumping or filling, with

~~ssaohusetts,

New Hampshire and Rhode Island allowing imprisonment
as well.

82'

Connecticut and

Mass~chuset~s

provide that

every day a violation continues shall be a separate
offense, with the result
prohibitive.

Even more

tha~

the fines can be made

effe~tive

than a fine, insofar

as the wetlandS are concerned, is relief ordering theirrestoration, to the extent possible, to their condition
before the violat ion.

Connect iout, l\oIaine and Rhode
Island have provisions for such orders. 83
Only Connecticut and Rhode Island have put explicit

statements in their statutes that a permit may be

suspe~ded

or revoked by the administrative agency if its conditions
are violated. 84

Connecticut goes one step further and

allows the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Prate'ctian at his discretion to require

an

applicant

to post a bond to secure the carrying out of whatever
conditions have been imposed.

While probably ,seldom

needed., such authority could be valuable in the case
of recalcitrant developers.

All the states, with the

exception ,of Rhode Island, also specifically give their
courts the power to restrain violators before the appeal
of the order itself can be decided.

aS
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Massachusetts and New Hampshire have set up
environmental protection divisions within the offices of

.

thelr attorney generals.,

86

Massachusetts also states that

any "natural resources officer" or other officers "having
police powers" may en:forc·e its statute. 87

New Hampshire

provides for any law enforcement officer to report any
violations to the Water Resources Board. 88 Maine specifies
that its statute may be enforced by the Commissioner of
Marine Resources,89 while Rhode Island gives the same
authority to a division of enforcement within the Department
of Natural Resources. 90 Giving enforcement powers
to any law enforcement officer, combined with the requirement for a posting of any permit on the land,9 l would
s'eem to give the bes't chance of having violations brought
to the attention of the proper authorities, bolstering
the efforts of conservation groups and other concerned
citizens in watching for violation.s.

Having enough

enforcement officers to check on all the permits granted
as, well as generally o,bserving activities along the
coast would appear to be somewhat of a problem.

7.

Appeals and Relief
The appeal procedures of the various states are

generally similar.

In Massachusetts, where the original

decision is left· to the municipality>, the Department
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of Natural Resources has first reviewing authority if an
order has been issued. 92

It has authority to make the

initial determination if no hearing has been held within
the 2.1 day period from the submission of an application or
no decision has been made within 21 days of a hearing.
T'he Commissioner, any person aggrieved by the order or the
lack of an order, any abutting owner, or any 10 municipal
residents may, within 10 days of the issuing of the order
or the failure to make an order, request the Department
"to determine [among other things3 Whether the area on
whioh the proposed

w~rk

is to be done is significant to

protection of land containing shellfish or to the protection
of fisheries. "

The Department has 70 days within which

to respond, and no work may be done on the project until
10 days after its order, which supercedes the local
conservation commission's, has been issued.
Maine can be said to have a form of discretionary,
non~statutory. administrative appeal. 9J If the Board
of Environmental Protection feels that the application
or the municipality's decision has created sufficient
pUblic concern . it

wi~l

have a full"'dress public hearing,

which gives parties a chance to present their views
to the Board directly.
connecticut gives the right to an administrative
appeal under its Administrative Procedure Act. 94

New
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Hampshire also allows a participant in the proceedings
befor.e the Water Resources Board to petition for .a
rehearing wit.hin

2.0

days of its ord,er.

The granting

of a r,ehearing is discretionary. but no j'udicial appeal
may be taken unless a rehearing has been requested.

The

Board mus't decide wi thin 10 days whether to grant or deny
the petition or to suspend its order for further consideration. 95
In Connecticut. Maine and New Hampshire, the applicant
is given the specific right to appeal to the appropriate
court for rell ef from the r,estricti ve order or denial
of a permit. 96

In addition, any other person. including

an "interested community group," aggrieved by an ord·er

may appeal in Connecticut, While in New Hampshire the
right is restricted to "a party to or participating in
the action or proceedings before the Board."
the

imp~ication

In Maine

of the statute is that only an applicant

may appeal,97 but the wording is ambiguous.
and Rhode Island there are no

speci~ic,

In Massachusetts

statutory provisions

relating to appeals in wetlands cases, but applicants and
others would have a right to appeal under administrative
procedures acts. 98
The statutory grounds for relief are generally
couched in t,erms of an unreasonable or unjust: use of
the police power, equivalent to a taking without compensation. 99 If the court finds that there has been
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a taking, Connecticut and New Hampshire specifically

give the administrative body two optionsl

either reverse

the original order or amend any conditions; or allow
the court to assess damages in accordance with the state's
normal compensation pr,ocedures .100

In the other s,tates

the relief would be much the ,same in practice.

D.

Administratiye Orders

Maine and Massachusetts have nearly equivalent
legislation giving the relevant state agency authority
to issue general orders regulating dredging, filling;
or otherwise altering or polluting any wetlandS area. IOl
The definitions of wetlands and the legislative purposes
of these statutes parallel
permit statutes.

thQ~e

outlined in the individual

By having the authority to issue general

orders the two states are given a chance to anticipate
the destruction of wetlands and prohibit damaging projects
before they are initiated by private owners.

But, un-

fortunately, only Massachusetts' has used this valuable
statutory authority.
The Massachusetts legislation has been very successful
in allowing the state to put protective
part of the state's wetlands.

o~ders

on a large

By June 30, 1971, 30% of

the state's roughly 60,000 acres of wetlands Were

pro~

tected, while orders covering another 42% were being
processed.

The Department of Natural Resources, acting with
the approval of the Board of Natural Resources, 102 makes
a careful study ,of each area, deeiding which land it wants
to protect after consulting with local conservation
commissions.

Preliminary discussions are held with owners

and municipal officials before a public hearing is held.
Every owner affected by the proposed ,order is given a
chance to talk with a state official about the proposed
order, although only about 5% do.

The Department negotiates

with any who protest and apparently has had to make few
important, concessions of leaving property outside the
coverage of the order.

Even if an owner"s property is left

outside tne protected area, he would

stil~

have to obtain

a permit to develop his land, and that requirement
courages many.

dis~

Although the Department has money to buy

easements or the fee outright, little haa been needed.
Many own,ers have been happy to cooperate, knowing that the

land around them will be protected as

wel~.

The final

orders are recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds.
These orders consist of defining certain activities
that may occur without regulation, otner activities
that may occur under certain oonditions and others
require a epecial permit.

They in effect' ac't as

tha~
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conservation easements.

Any appeal of an Qrder must be

taken within 90 days of the o'wner reoeiving notice of
the order, and such petitions are the exclusive way of
determining the validity of such orders.

The court is to

hold the order inapplicable to only the petitioner's land
if it finds that "such order so restricts the use of the
[petitioner's] property as to deprive him of the practical
uses thereof and is therefore an unreasonable exercise of
the police power because the order constitutes an equivalent
of a taking without compensation."

The Department may

then "take the fee or any les,sel' interest ••. by eminent
domain."

In fact, there has been no sustained litigation,

and the result is that in a relatively short time the
Department knows whether it has effective protection. lO ]
Rhode Island's Coastal Resources Management Council
is authorized to implement regulations concerning "the
resources of the state's coastal region."l04

Any proposed

development is to be tested against these standards in
order to see whether it would conflict with them

01'

'isignificantly damage the environment of the coastal
region."

"Intertidal salt marshes" are specifically in-

cluded as being areas "in which there is a reasonable
probability of conflict with a plan or program for resources
management or damage to the coastal environment ...105

The

extent to Which this authority has been used is not known
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at the present time.
Both the Ma$sachusetts and Rhode Island schemes
are more in the nature of planning mechanisms than

individual permit statutes.

This direction is the one

that state efforts will proba'bly take in the future' be-

cause of both federal encQuragement under the Coastal
Zone Management Act. 106 and the realiz.ation that to preserve
one part of the coastal zone while ignoring the rest is
not very fruitful.

The Massachusetts success is encouraging,

and the other states should certainly think hard about
following its lead.
but it may well

~ead

The scheme requires time and expertise',

to a greatly diminished use of the

individual permit procedure. 107

In any case it wauld

probably be much more difficult to obtain a variance from

the us,es allowed in the order than to obtain

.8

permit under

the other statutory scheme because the public interest
in the land has already been established after a public
hearing and the owner has at least acquiesced in that
decision.
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III.

JUDICIAL REJOINDERS - POLICE POWER

REGULATION OR COMFENSABLE TAKINGS?

A.

The Pr·esent Status

The testing of the New England wetlands legislation
in the courts has as yet been only fragmentary.

The

courts have generally acknowledged the broad right
of legislatures to set up regulatory schemes in this
area of environmental protectionl08 and have found them
to be constitutional ~n their detail. 109 The chief
issue has been whether a property owner denied a permit

t·o dredge or fill his wetland can successfully challenge
the administrative agency's decision on the ground
that it results in an unconstitutional taking of property.110
Although at first glance, and in the view of many commentators,lll it seems that the judicial results have
been less than happy from the perspective of wetlands
preservation, the present state of affairs is by no
means so discouraging.
The issue of when regulation of property is a
legitimate utilization of a state"s broad police power
or a constitutionally impermissable taking unless the

owner is compensated is an old one and
. t
SU b Jec

0

f mue·hI'1 t

. t 10n.
.
11219a

has been the

I
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review that history here. II )

It is sufficient to say

that there is no clear resolution of the issue and that
courts and commentators continue to search for one.

The

growing realization of the need to protect the environment
and the

resu~ting

increase in the statutory regulation of

property for environmental purposes has given a new focus
to the issue and has led to calls for the evolution of
new attitudes towards governmental regulation of private
property.
Of the various doctrines, used in the past to

tell Whether a regulation resulted in a taking, the
diminution of value theoryl14 seems to have the most contemporary vigor. 115 In State y. JOhnson,116 the first state
case to rule ,on a wetlands statute, and seen by so many
as a disaster for the successful preservation of the
environment, lI 7 the Maine Supreme Court held that the
denial of a permit without compensation was unconstitutional.
To prohibit the Johnsons from filling their land for a
housing project depri vea them of the, profitable use of
their land and so reduced its value
taking.

a~

to constitute a

In Dooley v, TQ!n Plan and _Zonin~ Qommission,llB

cited in JOhnson,l19 and in Bartlett v. Zoning Co mm ission,120
the Connecticut Supreme Court held that local zoning
ordinances worked such a diminution in the value of the

property involved that compensation was required.
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In Massachusetts, ,QQwn,i.ssipDer oi.Natyral Resourg e.s

v. S. Yaple & Co., 121 also cited in Johnson as suppolrt.ing
that decision,122 involved a permit granted by the state
.
12'J
under the predecessor of the present statute. .

It

allowed the owner to dredge part of Broad Marsh in Wareham
for a marina but not to fill any of it for housing.

Al-

though the trial court had found that the denial was not
a taking of property, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded
the case for a determination of what other uses of the
property were available to the owner.

Thus,

ra~her

supporting the JOhnSQn decisiQn, Volpe left the

than

p~lice

power regulation versus the taking question open.

The

Massachusetts court did go to some lengths to focus on
determining the diminution in value Qf the property by the
wetlands restriction by listing a series of questions it
wished answered. 124

Unfortunately, on remand, the case

came before a trial jUdge apparently unsympathetic to the
sta~e's

position, and the prohibition against filling was

dropped. 125
problem I

These cases clearly outline the wetlands

to preserve them requires the prohibition of

dredging or filling, but to do

SQ

is generally seen as

making the land virtually worthless, thus requiring the
owner to be compensated.

Even if the great economic value

of a wetland to society is granted, how, in all fairness,
the argument runs,126 ean the individual owner be made to
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pay the price f.or its preservation?

There are a number of

answers to that crucial question that are emerging, and
they will be discussed later in this paper.
More recent cases offer greater hope that the
courts will not characteri2e the denial of dredge or
fill permits as takings.

T'he Massachusetts co-urt, in

Turnpike Realty ~Q. y, Dedham,IZ7 a case analogous to
Volpe, held a zoning ordinance; severely restricting
the use of property inc.luded in a flood plain district,
not to be a taking.

The similarities of Dedham to the

wetlands situation are encouraging.

The purposes for the

restriction found by the court included the protection of
neighboring property owners from flood damage and of the
public :from. expenditures for flood relief, 128 purposes
at least implicit in the wetlands legislation.

Citing

Vartelas y. Water Re§oyr~s CDmmission,129 a Connecticut
case upholding the establishment of stream channel encroachment lines, the Massachusetts court characterized
the restriction in Dedham as preventing harm to the public
interest rather than taking property for the' public welfare.
It therefore found that no compensation was Dequired. 1JO
Certainly prohibiting t'he dredging or filling of a wetland
lik~wise

prevents harm to t,he public interest caused! by

the destruction of valuable nutrients for marine and
animal life as well as by flooding.

The prohibiting is

not for the purpose of taking the wetlanqs and doing something

with them for the public welfare not now being done.
The Dedham court did not, however, address directly
the diminution in valUe aspect found so important in the
Johnson, Dooley, and Bartlett cases.

The Turnpike Realty

Company argued that the zoning restriction caused an 88%

reduction in value, a figure challenged by the municipality,
but the trial court made no specific finding on the matter.
In its opinion the Supreme JUdicial Court cited Dooley
as being contra, but did not discuss it further and did
not mention either Bartlett or Johnson.l)l

So the

diminution in value issue remains problematic.
Another aspect of the case is troubling as well.

As tl').e Chief Justice- pointed out in his concurranc·e, no
spe'cific permit applicati.on had yet been made, and
he said that the issue

o~

cQmpensation should be decided

when it was clear exactly what depri,vation Turnpike Realty
had suffered by being included in the flood plain district. l32

If an application had been denied, the deprivation of a
wetlands owner would be clearly focused, and it would be
easier for a court to come down on the other side of the
illusive lLne dividing a "free" police power regulation
from a costly taking.

In Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Environmental

Prot_ection,133 the Connecticut Supreme Court recently'

decided its first case dealing with tbe. state s basic
I

wetlands preservation statute.

The court upheld the

denial o,f a permit to fill 5. J acres of land within a
designated wetlands area.

Again

Doo~e¥

and Bartlett

were cited, but the, court declared them to be "not
controlling under the facts of this case.

There has

been no 'practical confis'cation' of the plaintiff's land."
The court admitted that the "wetland would have gr,eater
value to him [the owner] if it were filledJ" but strong
statutory statements of the public interest in prohibiting

the filling of wetlands and in the environment in general
apparently helped to tip the scales in favor of not requiring compensation. 1J4 Quoting Corsino x, Grover,135
the court said that "'the welfare of the public, rather than
private gain, is a paramount consideration •. "lJ6
I

Building on a dictum in the earlier Vartelas case,

which had stated that even when a specific permit application had been denied, the question of "[w]hether

the plaintiff could build another type of structure - for
example one on piers or cantilevers" had not been pas'sed
on,137 the ]recciaroli court concluded that the permit

denial did not exhaust the owner's uses [or his land.
It stressed tha.t ,,[ t ]h.e deniaL •. merely prohibited one

spe'cifie use •..• [ the owner] may still be permitted on
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subsequent application to fill a lesser portion ••• to

conduct other regulat,ed activities on t)le wetland!" .[or to]
make any reasonable unregulated use of his land •..• " 1 )8
In a sense the result was better than that in Dedham; in
Brecciaroli the owner had applied for a specific permit and
had still been turned down.

But the fact remains that the

De'partmen.t might well not grant a permit for a smaller fill ...
ing, and the court seemed to invite the owner to challenge
another permit denial.
There is some comfort, however, in that the court
recognized "the importance of wetlands as natural resources"

and the threat of "their imminent demise at the hands of
man. ulJ9 The Johnson and Volpe courts had also acknowledged
the impo~tance of wetlands ,140 and that fact is crucial.
For the key to success in upholding the purpose of the

wetlands legislation is to make the connection between the
specific denial of a permit and the important pUblic purpose to be served thereby as tight as possible.

The courts

are moving away from a seemingly automatic use of the
diminuti.on in value theory to one involving a more delicate
balancing between individual loss on ,one hand and pUblic
logs on the other. 141 The latest Supreme Court case
on the issue, Goldbl~t;t

'Y.

Hempstead,142 cited by

Brecciaroli for this proposition,14) stated that "while

a comparison of values before and after [restrictions]
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is relevant ... it is by no

me~ns

.
144
conclus1ve.

B.•, Alternatiye Solutions
Before examining how to meet· the taking iss.ue
head on, in the caSe of wetlands, we might pause briefly
to analyze the possible alternatives.

One obvious solution

to the problem of preserving wetlands is for the states
to compensate private owners whe·n the courts require it.
But, 'the practical inadequacy of thi's solution is equally

apparent.

While the New England states have statutory

programs for the acquisition of rights in wetlands,145 and
some are using them, the funds available are inadequate.
Undeveloped land is not generally bought by eminent domain
at a price commensurate with its natural state but rather
at one reflecting its reasonable, developed potential. 146
The cost, then, is very high, and states generally have been
reluctant to appropriate funds on the scale necessary to
preser~e

significant amounts of their dwindling supply

of wetlands. 14 ?
A middle course that would be less expensive would
be to increase the use of conservation easements.

Most

of the states have statutes providing for the purchase
of such easements by state or local governments. 148
Such easements may be tailored to fit the specific
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circumstances. restric,ting only the uses harmful to the

particular environment involved.

The Massachusetts

protective orders 149 have the same effect of only partially
restricting the use of land.

The combination of

flexibil~ty

and a lower cost may make easements a more promising
alternative than outright purchase, 150 but, despite some
success, neither course,

wh~ther

used alone or together.

is, li'kely to answer the entire problem of wetlands preservation.

A relatively costless system of regulati'on that

will cover even reluctant owners is s,till needed.
Another, easier alternative is to do nothing'i
If the legislative schemes presently on the books are
run efficiently and enforced effectively, they may achieve

considerable success.
~ecision,

Despite the "disastrous" Johnson

the Maine Board of Environmental Protection has

,continued to deny permits to those seeking to fill wetlands .15 1
While its figures show a denial rate of only 12 to 14% of
all applications for wetlands permits. 152 they mask the
real workings of the administrative system.

A large number

of applications are submitted several times, and by
negotiation many are changed sufficiently to meet the Board's
'firmly held poliey of allowing no filling unless there is
both no other feasible alternative and the project is seen
as vital to the state .153

But while there have 'been no

persistent legal challenges to these denial's, that situation
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is not likely to, las't.

Givan the Johnson decision, there

is oound to be a Maine developer willing to fight for
his permit in the courts.

Furthermore, there is no

guarantee that the same results will occur in the other
states should adverse decisions be handed down.
the compensation issue

~ust

So

be met directly if there is

to be effective and widespread preservati,on of wetlands.

c.

Arguments-Jpr" Police Power Regulation

There are several ways in which the case for
characterizing wetlands preservation as a police power
regulation can be strenghtened.

And it needs to be

strengthened, not just for the environmental cause, but
for satisfactory judicial results.

For although the courts

have held that no taking has occurred in several c'ases,
their reasons for doing so have often been ambiguous and
conclusionary.

Such decisions satisfy no one, neither the

losing 'property owner, the stat,e agencies charged with
preserving wetlands, nor the cause of reasoned just ice.,

It

is by' no means clear that the cases. as they stand, are
always fair to the property owner.
determined to make up for

it~

If society is now

past failings in guarding the

natural environment, why should he, and not society in
general, oear the' economic burden?

The response is that
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property owners in many cases are not justified in their
claims for compensation because they are not losing as
much as they may think and they do not have the freedom
of us'e that they assert.

1.

Alternative uses of wetlandS
Clearly the case for preserving wetlands would

be strengthened by citing alternative economic uses for
wetlands.

For the

cour~s,

even where they have upheld

permit denials, have never said that a complete diminution
in value escapes being a taking.

At best the courts have

helped the state's counsel along by saying that it is not
yet clear that no alternative use can be found.

One does

not get the impression that respondents have helped themselves

very often

by

giving the courts examples of other uses. l54

In fact, there is a limited market for open land, per

~,

as, increasing numbers of people leave overcrowded urban
environments for What remains of the country.

Scientists

or school administrat,ors may pay some'thing for the use of
such land as a natural laboratory.15S

Clearly the

possibilities of aquaculture have only ,just begun to be
explored.

As our understanding of the role of wetlands in

the prevention of siltlng increases, government agencies
such as the Army Corps of Engineers may fLnd it economic
to buy easements to wetlands near frequently dredged
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estuaries.

Wetlands can certainly 'be used for ut ili ty lines

a.s, individual pilings do relatively little damage.

Indeed,

it may not be impossi bl·e to 'build structures o'n unobtrusive

piers.

The limited use of the water by boats, without

dredging, is also not harmful.
Some of these uses may produce little economic
return, but present doctrine, s'eems to require a,t least
something.

Furthermore, just

a~

one commentator has said

that the many. new land use restrictions imposed by various
levels of government may add up to a virtual loss of all
use,l5 6 so we must also count on the other side the full
range of possible, profitable uses of that restricted land,
so that the full costs and benefits of environmental
legislation may be weighed.

As one practitioner has observed,

the struggle to preserve wetlands calls for yet another use
of the Brandeis brief With its non-legal evidentiary
authorities. 157

2.

Th.e

Nu~unce

Argument

Another, more complex line of argument that Ynay
have value for bolstering the preservation cause is that
centered around what might be called a private nuisance
theory.

As Professor sax argues, the uses made of individual

pieces of
it is

prope~ty

unr~asonable

affect the neighboring property, and
to loak at the diminution in value of
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one piece without considering its effect on the other.

A

restriction placed on one piece of land may improve another a
the absence of a restriction may harm another.

The law

has long allowed a plaintiff to seek the prohibition of a
particular use of his neighbor·s land if he suffers ,special
injury because of that use.

But in much compensation

litigation, the courts have only looked at the effect on
the party protesting regulation, without evaluating the
"ripple" effect on other owners of allowing certain uses
to go unchecked. l58 Obviously wetlands are an example of
how the use of one piece of property extends to another.
The destruction of one part of a productive wetland may
destroy another because of the changes made in any of the
many delicate balances that go into making a wetland. 159
But one problem with the use of this argument

in the case of wetlands is that it is the cumulative
effect of the destruction of wetlands that is most
measur.able.

It is extremely difficult to pin down what

the loss to others is because of the destruction of one
area of wetlands.

The state in the Johnson case clearly

had difficulty with this argument and really had to concede
that it was not particularly concerned with the filling of
the Johnson's property but with the loss of the Whole
marsh. 160

But as our knowledge of how wetlands function

increases, and we have a better understanding of the
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interrelation of one part of a wetland to another and how
much each area of wetland can produce, we may reach a point
when we can measure more precisely the loss stemming from
the destruction of only portions of a wetland.

Then the

private nuisance argument may well be useful.
Another problem with the private nuisance argument
i~

that it should be used only in situations where commonly

accepted rights of property ownership have been, violated.
Compensation should be required where the law may have
suddenly created some new duty.16l The Dooley case L62
was an instance where this argument, only implicitly
allud,ed to, probably had gr"eat force.

There a flood plains

zoning restriction was challenged and the fact that the
owner had already been assessed over $lltOOO for a sewer
system, giving him the expectation of being allowed to
develop his property, may have given the court the equity
argument it needed to overturn What it recognized as the
good, public purposes 0f the rezoning. 16J The Johnson
case 164 was another e'xample of What were seen to 'be the
owner's legitimate expectations being frustrated by' new
regulations.

Part of the Johnsons! property had aLready

been filled in and houses built and sold.

Another area of

the affected wetlands, across from the Johnsons' property,
had previously been filled in. 165 Naturally the court
was sympathetic to their claim of unfairness.
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But the notion that property owners should have
a legally protected right to, the, fully developed value
of their property should be rejectea.

They do not have

a right to be compensated for a speculative return on their
investment that they, thems,elveS, might never achieve .166
As one commentator noted in relation to the Johnson, case

j

while a court may say that an owner is being deprived of
the value of his land as

bui~ding

sites,

th~

court is

certainly in no position to say that the housing market,
When the houses are finished, will provide the owner with
his expected P~Ofits.167 Any development has a host of
pos sible risks attached to it.

That· a governmen't agenQY

may put certain restrictions in its, way is but one of th.em.

For a court to hold that an owner may be compensated
at the level of his expectations also ignores the fact
that property uses, and thus values, are all interrelated.
If the Jonnsons should build their second group of houses,
the value of the houses already built, which may have
sold at a premium because of the proximity of open land,

may well be reduced.

Thus, the neighboring owners suffer

deprivation because of an activity thought not to be in the
public interest,

~.,

the filling of a wetland.

Courts

should recognize that what one owner proposes to do is
seldom an isolated event, with no economic ramifications
on others.

They should be willing to hold, in the words

of one' writer, that "the public autherity in denying the
fill permit took no existing use rights of the landowner.
but instead merely decided not to participate in the effort
to create new ones.

For the need for a permit from the

It

state is as crucial to the proposed development as the
filling itself. 168

As a recent First Circuit opinion

observed, "all changes in the law dash expectations when
t'hey make t omorI' oW t s rules different fr om yest erday , s • ,,169

With the use of the public trust argument ,out-lined below,
one can, maKe a good case that the wetlands regulations are
neither unreasonable nor unexpected restrictions on the
legitimate uses of property.1 70

One criticism of the nuisance theory - tnat in
many cases causation of the harm cannot be fairly laid at
the owner's feet l ?l- does not apply to the wetlands case.
In othet situations the critieism may be valid.

Natural

occurances may cause the narm,17 2 o~ development may overtake a '0nce reasonable use of property.I?J

Newly perceived
social virtues may require new restrictions,l74 or an
otherwise harmless activity may be seen as indirectly aiding

an undesirable one. 175
in such cases is unfair.

It may be that to deny compensation
But with wetlands, it is clear

that it is the owner who is creating the harm.

Whenever

produ'ctive wetlands have been f.illed they ha,ve harmed the
e~vironmentf

and despite its

~equent

abuse, there has long
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been some realization that the environment must be protected
for the interests of us all. l76

.3.

The Public Trust _Argument l ??
Jus't as the destruction of one piece of a wetland

may harm another piece belonging to a neighboring upland
owner, so it will harm the seaward owner, the state, and
the land and waters that 'the state holds in trust for the
public.

Simply stated, the argument has two parts.

First,

the alteration of a wetland may involve the use of pUblic
property by directly appropriating water over which "the
federal government exercises paramount control" because of
its navigability, or land that may belong to the state because of its ownership of the seabed below high or low
water, depending on the applicable law. 178 Second, the
alteration of a wetland may impinge upon public rights indirectly by adversely affecting neighboring public property,
Each government involved owns its property in trust £or
the public, and while littoral, or upland, owners

~y

have

c,ertain privileges in connection with that property because
it borders their own, they do not have the right to do with

it as they p~ease.179 Thus, in denying a permit for an
acti.vity that would harm the pUblic interest - here, the
public interest in the preservation of wetlands, clearly
expressed by the respective legislatures - the state
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agency is protectLng the property rights of the public.
There is no taking of priv:ate pro'perty but rather the
prevention of the taking of pUblic property.
The strength of the public trust argument with
r,egard to wetlandS preservation will vary depending upon
which part of 'the wetland is involved and in Which state
it is located.

F,ar "the otherwise convenient geographical

region of New England has two distinct, land ownership
doctrines for tidal property.

In Maine and Massachusetts,
where the 1641-47 Colonial Ordinance l80 governs, private
owners have rights to the mean low

wa~er

mark, Whereas in

Connecticut, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, the line is the
more common one of mean high water. 181 Since the productive
areas of wetlands range from below low water to at least
one foot above high water,l82 the public trust argument may
be useful in some areas of the wetland and not others.
The nature of the public trust over the foreShore 183
held by the state is nowhere precisely laid out.

It stemmed

originally from the Roman law and underwent many tl'ansformations in Anglo-American law during the period from Magna
Carta to, the present.

lts evolution continues today as

the pUblic interest changes.

While English law resisted

any expansion of the rights of the pUblic in free navigation
in tidal waters

y

that in the United States

recogni~ed

pUblic rights in fishing, camping, hunting and recreation.
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The definition of navigable waters was expanded from in-

eluding only tidal waters to one including those navigable.
f ac t • 184
InConnectieut's law

s~ates

that the state owns both

the foreshore and the soil under navigable waters in
trust for public us,e, and that the public has: certain
rights in all navigable waters.

Tidal waters are presumed

navigable, but the question is one of fact.
use "must be, for useful gain and occupation."
of the pUblic interest in the foreshore,

The navigable
The extent

se~bed

and navigable

waters includes navigation. recreation, and the "commercial
and consumer use- of sea produce."

The upland owner has

rights in the ,foreshore that can be separately conveyed

from his upland title, but he does not have actual ownership
of the foreshore.

His rights in it consist of the right of

access from the sea, the right to "wharf out" and the right
of ownership o£ reclaimed land or natural accretions. 185
But 'those rights are SUbject to state control.
As one commentator writes.

"To the extent that state

activity and regulation is necessary to secure the benefits
of public waters for the well-being of the pUblic, the
. d'3. V3.. d ua l rlparlan
·
.
. h' t ·3.S SU,bservl-,en
. t and '3.n f er1,oc'.
. - •• 186
'In'
rlg

Thus, in Shorehaven Golt Club. Inc. y, Water Resources
commission,187 SZ,estowicki y. Water Resources Commission, 188
ang Rvkar Industrial Corp. Va Gill, 189 the Connecticut
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courts have upheld denials of permits to dredge a channel,
extend a pier and fill a wetland, respectively, on the
ground that a private interest was properly subordinated to
the public interest.

In Rykar the court clearly recognized

the importance of the wetland and found the public's
interest in it of more importance than the owner's interest
in being able to have access to the sea by the cheapest
means possible, in this case by filling the wetland. 190
In Shorehaven the court likewise said that it was possible that
less disruptive alternatives than dredging existed.1.91
T'hus, the pUblic trust argument has bite in Connecticut,
even the extreme cas,eof denying an upland owner what, might
seem to be his strongest privilege in public land - eaSY
access to the sea.
In New Hampshire, too, the courts have acknowledged
that t,idal waters belong to the public and that wetlands
are thus SUbject to state regulation in the pUblic interest.
In Sibson-Y', State the court said that "the rights of
littoral owners on public waters are always subject to the
paramount right of the State to control them reasonably in
the interests of navigation, fishing and other public
purposes ... 1 92
The Rykar case raised the important question of
the validity of regulation of the one foot of land above
the high water mark allowed by the wetlands statute. 19J
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The court found the record unclear as to what land was
involved in the proposed project and wisely avoided. the
issue by re'asoning that the appellant would" in any case,
have to submit a revised application and that the issue could
be resolved at that later time. 194 In arguing that such
regulation is valid, even in states where private ownership
extend.s to the low water mark. it could be pointed out tha,t
the water in the wetland between the areas of upland is

navigable and thus subject to the public trust doctrine.

By

definition the water is tidal, and thus presumptively
navigable.

In many cases it may be used by fishermen in

pursuit of their public right of fishing, or by other upland
owners, who wish to see it preserved, as a meanS of access
to their land, thus making it navigable-in-fact.

The

federal .gov·ernment will thus have rights over the wate·r,
and the state will own the so,11 beneath.

In those states

owning ·to the high water mark, the state owns more of the
land threatened by the filling or dredging.

By filling the

wetland the private owner will in effect be expropriating
pUbl i cproperty •

In that cas,e it is the government that

should be compensated, not the private owner.

The 1641-47 Colonial Ordinance 195 may reduce
the force o,f the publi.o trust argument in rl"l8.ine and
Massachusetts i~sofar as a direct injury to the state
is asserted. 196 Much less of any wetland wi.ll actually
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be public property.

The private

however, was not absolute.

II

propriety" .granted,

The same pUblic rights of access,

navigation and fishing that are found in the high water
mark

sta~es were specifically reserved by the Ordinance. 197

For instance, the Maine Supreme Court has long recognized the
importance of estuaries to the valuable fishing trade.

In

1881 it held that the upland owner holds the foreshore •.•

subject to certain reserved rights of the
public.

Navigation must not be obstructed,

nor the pa8sag'e, of fish into bays, creeks,
or up the course of navigable rivers, without legislative authority.
of common right,

and

These are matters

such an obstruction of

them, even by the holder of the fee in the
. a
sea 8 h ore, 18

It went on t08aya

pU bl"10

"
198
nUlsance,

"It is true, in the present in-

stance, that the jus publicum may be of trifling value.
But the principle is an important one, protecting the
openness of navigable waters, and must be observec:t.,,199
In the same vein the Massachusetts court in Henry v.'
NewburYRort stated that the "Legislature could, for the
protection of the rights of the public in navigation,

or

for the security of the coast [from storm damage], regulate
the use of the territory between high-water and lowwater
mar k , ...

,,200

-54-

The New England legislatures have regula:ted w'etlands
t,he purpose of protecting the public interest in navigation,
fishing' and coastal protection. 201

Wetlands serve the

same function as rivers in the spawning of marine life, and
their loss would mean the loss. of the sustenance and habitat
of many creatures.

Just as the Col,onial Ordinance was

passed to foster water commerce by expanding the right to
build wharves, so wetlands

l~gislation

to help prevent flood control.

was passed, in part,

Thus" it could be said!

that a private owner of wetlands holdS the foreshore
sUbject to a public

tru~t

of maintaining them in

natural, productive condition.

th~ir

It is a trust that has

been in existence for over three nundred years, but one
recognized to be increasingly important in this century.
If the private owner fills in his land he directly violates
that trust, just as he violates state ownership rights in
the case of states using the high water mark.
The second part of the public trust argument,
that public rights may be indirectly affected by the
destruction of a wetland, applies to all the states,
regardless of Where the line of private ownership ends.
It asserts that wetlands perform a unique and valuable
service and that their destruction would be an intolerable
deprivation of public rights to the produce of the sea.

For wetla.nds are valuable fax- beyond their immediat,e environs.
For instance I only Some 55% of the average 10 tons of
organic matter producea by a wetland per acre, per year, is
used in the
marsh

in~o

we~land

itself.

The rest, broken down in the

usable food, is washed away into the estuaries

and coastal waters to be used by a wide variety of fish and
shell fish. 202

Thus, no matter where actual state ownership

begins, the state's resources are affected by whether the
wetlands are preServed.
As we have seen, to survive, wetlands should
2
be le'ft alone as much as possible. 0 3

The Council on

l1'nvironmental Quality, which has described wetlands as
"cri tical natural features," state'd in its

FOur~h

Annual

Reports
The emphasis on the functions that certain
critical lands serve in their natural state
simply explains why a court's determination
that a

par~mount

public interest limits the

'right' to alter the land's features does
not overturn legitimate prior expectations
of property owners. 204
This concept of the importance to the public of keeping
a unique resource, in this case wetlands r in its natural
state found strong expression in the Just v. Marinette

-56-

.. -

Count y

0pJ.n~on.

205

It upheld the denial of a fill application

under a county, inland shoreland zoning ordinance, saying;
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character o,f his land s,o as' t'o USe it for a
purpose fo·r which it was unsuited in it·s
natural state

and

which injures the rights

of others. 206
It distinguished the Doolev 207 and JOhnson208 cases by
saying that those courts had assumed "that an owner has a
right to use his property in any way and for any purpose
he sees fit.,· 20 9 The ~ court strongly rejected that
notion.
The state's case in Just was helped by the fact
that Wisconsin's public trust doctrine is
clear.
1_e d ge

particularl~

The owner, therefore, could be held to have know0

· d_U t Y no t t
f h 1.5

0'

h arm'
th e publ"1.C In-eres
t
t • 210

But it can be argued that the New England wetlands statutes
and the other legislation concerned with the environment
in general have also .made clear that private property
rights are, in appropriate cases, subject to regulation
by the state.

The ancient public interest in navigation

and fis'hing, under which the foreshore has long been
subject to regulation, now encompasses wetlands.

We now
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realize theiI direct relationship to the prevention of
flooding and silting and the maintenance of a successful
fishing industry.

As a Council on Environmental Quality

report put itl
To require an owner

~o

assume the risk of

changing notions of property in the case of
land that exhibits on its face its pUblicly
critical nature is a significantly lesser
imposition than the risk assumed, for example,
by the brewery owners in Mugler v. Kansas
concerning possible changing pUblic attitudes
toward alcoholic beverages. 2l1
In the case of wetlands we are dealing with property that
not only has a clear, public purpose, but also has been
regulated in a variety of other ways in the past for the,
very same purposes.

Because of its proximity to and effect

on the public trust areas, the foreshore, and thus large
parts of

we~lands,

too, have already been subject to

certain public servitudes, whether or not the fee has been
in

priva~e

or public hands.

It is true that the form of regulation - preservation
,of the natural state - has taken a new form in the wetlands
case and that it goes against the old notion of the
need for "improved" land.

p~blic

But today, in many ar,eas other
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than wetlandS, we know that the public is not always best
served by changing the nature of land, and property uses
212
W know tha t ,In
. mos"
~
" 1y
1 t e d accord ~ng
have· b e·en regu'a
.e
cases wetlands are far more valuable to society as a whole
as wetlands than as more house lots or factory sites. 213

But we also know that to destroy wetlands is also to destroy
indirectly resources that the state holdS for us all, and it
is that fact that is the basic justification in the public
trust argument for regulation without compensation.
We are late in realizing the need
portions of our heritage of open land.

t~

preserve

In so many areaS

of our environment we now see that we cannot continually
remake the landscape into something "better.

II

Our very

existence ultimately depends upon the maintenance of a
balance in nature - a balance that provides us with fresh
air, clean water and a varied and healthful supply of food.

Wetlands are but one part of this great natural jigsaw
puzzle of complex interrelationships.

But they have been

specifically singled out by statute for preservation.
Just as over

~hree

hundred years ago the Colonial Ordinance

sought to encourage commerce by altering traditional land
ownership patterns, 214 so now the

wet~and·s legislation seeks

to make the old concept of the public trust in the sea and
foreshore' meaningful in terms of today s needs.
I

The New

England courts have shown a Willingness to accept this

basic premise.

It is the task of counsel now to continue

to use the fruits of scientific research to demonstrate
in increasing detail the relationship betw'een the preservation of specific wetlands and the preservation ,of the
property rights of neighboring owners, including

t~e 6~ate,

and the rights of us' all in the many benefits that wetlands
give us.
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The legislative findings in the New England wetlands legislation make clear the need for the preservation
of these valuable, natural resources'.

The statutes set up

administrative systems in each state to issue conditional
permits in an attempt to regulate activities harmful to the
wetlands.

What can we conclude about these systems?

While

each varies in its details, each system does focus the dayto-day

atten~ion

of at least part of an executive department

in each state on the problems of wetlands.
is a problem - a need for

prese~vation

That there

- is at least

officially recognized, thus increasing the chances of not
having wetlands disappear altogether under the earth-moving
equipment of the developers.
On the administrative level mare staffing for
planning and enforcement is needed, however, if the full
potential of the legislation is to be reached.

As with

any relatively new regulatory scheme, there is a need for
the continuing education of the affected public.

Com-

prehensive enforcement can only come with the active help
of concerned citizens.

But state leadership is

to provide expertise and full-time commitment.
what role is given to

municipali~ies"

a~so

needed

No matter

a s.tatewide viewpoint
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is needed to insure that always: Scarce resouI'ces are used

to best advantage to resist development pressures.

Maine,

for example, has stood firm in the face of an adverse
judicial preeedent 2l5 and has not allowed any filling.
It is als'o fortunate to have a highly qualified regulatory
bOdy.216

All the states will have to continue to have

dedicated and resourceful administrators if the wetlands
are to be saved from more "profitable" \lses.
Massachusetts, with its protective orders system,21 7
has probably had the greatest succ'ess in actively protecting
wetlands ,.Maine, which has the necessary legislation on the
books, has regrettably not followed suit. 2l8 The great
defect of the permit system is that it is passive.

It dOles

not seek out the potentially threatened areaS tor preservation
but only seeks to block already .formulated plans.
in political terms this system may have

b~en

While

a necessary

first step, it is both inefficient and risky.

It allows the

possibility of having several permit applications involving
the same land over a period of time.

Ey waiting until

owners have their development plans in concrete form it
encour~ges

them to fight restrictive permits and nelps

courts find extreme diminutions in value.
or conservation ea,sements avoid these
are more expensive.

Protective orders

problem~,

but they

Undoubtedly all the states could use

more money for the aequisition of wetlands.
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At the jUdicial level recent court decisions have
been relatively

encouraging~

Maine appears to be looking

for a favorable case in the wetlands area with which to try
_.
219' bU t 1.-t has a 1rea dy
to over t urn th e J~o'hnson, d eC~Sl.on.
obtained a good land regulation verdict in In re-Spring
22l
Valle¥ Dgvelopment. 220 Massachusetts haS the Dedham
decision and Connecticut the Brecciaroli decision. 222 While
the courts have not gone as far as the administrators would
probably like, certainly a shift in jUdicial thinking seems
to be taking place.

There is also plenty of room for counsel

to strengthen their arguments in this area as scientific
knowledge in the wetlands area expands.
Clearly the wave of the future is regional and
statewide planning of the coastal zone.

Spurred by the

money available under the Coastal Zone Management Act,223
the states are beginning to define the coastal zone and
decide on what they wish to 'regulate. 224 This more complex
tas'k will require much thought about some o,f the same problems
that the wetlands legislation has raised.

Clearly the role

of local government units will have to be carefully thought
out.

The growth of regional planning agencies may

whatever roles the municipalities play now!

supplan~

Where to draw

the line between minor, unregulated activities and more
significant, controlled activities will also have to be
rethought.

Many New Englanders will not take kindly

to a host of new regulations o'r their land.

Many have

complained bitterly about the relatively mild restrictions
of the wetlands legislation. 225 Th,e coastal 'planners will
have an even more difficult time convincing the public of
the necessity of their work than the wetlands advocates did,
but the wetlands experi,ence should be of some help.
certainly the need for overall planning, difficult
as it will be, is there.

For While wetlands are parti-

cularly vulnerable to development and the potential
scientific effects of their loss are reasonably well known,
there are many other parts of the coastal zone that need
planning too.

Not all of these areas are in their natural

state, but the mix of housing, industry and services, all
of Which want and need some coastal space, should be planned
in the same way as the mix between wetlands and development
needs to be weighed under the present legislation.

Just

as it is important for migratory water birds to have a
string of wetlands available along the coast, rather than
having one large protected area, 226 so it is important that
New England has refineries as well as marinas, vacation
homes as well as nuclear power plants, all spaced
appropriately along the coast.

Interstate planning is

thus clearly necessary as well.
The present wetlands legislation will probably be
swallowed up by these more sophisticated planning
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developments, and so it should be.

For it serves largely

as a holding mechanism, blocking each proposed development
as it comes along, rather than affirmatively planning for
long-term preservation.

Hopefully, despite whatever success

it may have had in reducing the rat,e of despoilation, the

limitations of the wetlands legislation will be admitted
and its virtues not used to block needed reforms.
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FQOTKQ.TES

I.

THE NEED FOR PRESERVATION

A.
1.

Introduction

Unless an explicit distinction is made, "wetlands"
in this paper will refer to coastal, or tidal,
lands.

wet~

Inland w'etlands have not been discussed here

owing to the limits of time and space.

For legis-

lation dealing with their preservation, generally of
more recent origin than coastal wetlands legislation,
s~e

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. [hereinafter cited as Conn.]

22a-36 to -45 (Supp. 1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
inafter cited as

Me.)

[here~

tit. 38, 380 to 85 (1973) (only

ponds with a surface area greater than 10 acres and
the shore of which is owned by more than one owner are
inclUded); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. [hereinafter cited
as Mass.] ch. 1)1, 40A (1974); N.H. Rev. stat. Ann.
[hereinafter cited as

N.H.] 482.41-e (1968), 48)-AI1-

6 (Supp. 1973). 488-AI1-5 (1968>'; R.I. Ge,n Laws Ann.

[hereinafter cited as R.I.]

2-1-8 to -25 (Supp. 1974).

For a definition of coastal wetlands

~

text at note

8 infra.

Tbe states considered in this paper are
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Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island - the five c,oastal New England states.
T'he principal pieces of wetlands legi'slat ion are I
,Conn~cticut

- Conn. 22a-28 to -)5 (Supp. 1975)

(preservation of tidal wetlands), 25-4a to -4g
(Supp. 1975) (stream channel encroachment lines);
2.5-1.0 to -17 (Supp. 1975) (removal of sand and

gravel from lands under tidal and coastal waters);

26-17a (Supp. 1975) (acquisition

and

preservation

of ti.dal wetlands); Connectic\.lt Legislative Service

197), P.A. 73-562 (Environmental Policy Act,
effective February 1, 1975).
Maine - Me. tit. 12,

4701-09 (1974) (permits for

'tidal wetlands); tit. 12,

4701-58 (1974) (zoning

of wetlands); tit. 38, 541 (Supp. 1973) (legislativ,e,
findings, oil pollution).
Massachusetts • Mass. Const. amend. art. XLIX (Supp.

1975) (environmental rigbts); Mass ch. 130,

105

(1964) (protection of coastal wetlands')

1)1"

I

c.h.

40, 90 (1974) (filling and dredging of coastal
wetlands and violations).
New Hampsbire - N.R. 48J.-AI1-6 (Supp. 1973) (tidal
waters) •
Rhode Island - R.I. Const. amend. art. XXXVIII
(Supp. 1974) (preservation of natural resources);
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R.I.

2-13 to -17 (Supp. 1974) (coastal wetlands);

11-46.1-1 (Supp. 1974) (criminal offenses - inter-

tidal salt marshes).

46-17.1~1

to -2 (Supp. 1974)

(conservation of marine resources).
2.

Butman, Estuarine Interactions;

Some ConsiderAiions

[hereinafter cited as Butman], in Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Papers on

Nati~

Land Use Policy Issues, 92nd Cong., 1st Session
16)-66 (1971) [hereinafter ,cited as Papers].

At least one court has ordered, in some detail,
the restoration of a destroyed wetland.

Unite~

States v. Joseph G. Moretti. Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151

(S.D. Fla. 1971), vacated in Part and remanded, 478
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 197J) , 389 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.
1974).

Fla~

Such an order acts primarily as a deterrent

to other greedy developers, for i·t is unknown whether
that area of Key Largo, Florida can ever truly be
restored.

The Morettis were particularly flagrant

violators and thus incurred a.particularly costly
penalty.

3.

Ducsik, The Crisis im Shoreline

Re~reation

Lands

in Papers 107.

4.

The concern of Congress for the overall planning
aspect is evidenced by the passage of the Coastal
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Zone Mana·gement Act of 1972, 16 U. S.C .A.

14.51-64

(1974), which authorized federal assistance to the
coastal states to help them to set up development
plans for their coastal areas.

5.

See text at note 17 infra.

6.

Council on Environmental Quality, Second Annual
Report 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CEQ, Second].

7.

New England i-s one of six areas in the country wi'th
a regional development commission set up under the

Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C.

)121-3226 (1971), to improve the

economic healtn of "two or more contigUOUS states
related geographically and culturally and lagging
the nation in economic development,"

With

New

York it makes up one of seven interstate river
basin planning and compact commissions, set up
under the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965,

42 U.S.C.

1962 (1971), to protect and enhance

the environment.

United States

Adviso~y

Commission

on Intergovernment Relations, Multistate' Regionalism,

.Report

53-55 (1972).

F. Bosselman & D. Callies,

The Quiet Reyolution in Land Use Control, 262-289

(1971) [hereinafter cited as Bosselman,

Quiet Revoluti,on].

~
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B.

What

are' wetlands

and why

8.

See text at note 17 infra.

9.

R.I. 2-1-14 (Supp. 1974).

are they important?

It is unclear whether the

50 yards is measured from the edge of th.e '''salt
marsh" or "from the tidal waters."

22a-29(2) (Supp. 197J).

10.

Conn.

11.

N.H.

12.

While Rhode Island and Connecticut use the list of

483-At1,1-a(I) (Supp. 1973).

vegetation only as an addi'tional descriptive device.
New Hampshire makes the presence of some of the
listed vegetation mandatory by the omission of the
word "may" fr om the phras e "up on whic h may gr ow
or be capable of growing some, but not necessarily
all, of the following" that is: common to both its
and Connecticut's definitions.

4701 (1974).

13.

Me. tit. 12.

14.

Mass. ch. 130,

15.

The significance of these differences in the scope

105, ch. 131,

40 (1974).

of coverage, along with the accompanying differences
in explicit legislative 'purposes, becomes, more
apparent when one focuses on the arguments used to
justify characterizing restrictions on the use of
wetlands as police power re,gulation as opposed to
the taking of property.

-70-

There are also important definitional differences
in the vertical descriptions of wetlands.

'The

lower, seaward limits do not vary to any great
extent'.

Maine uses a boundary of "'extreme low

water."

Me. tit. 12,

4701 (1974).

Massachusetts'

phrase "lowlandssubje'ct to tidal action, "
chI 131,

~lass.

40 (1974), and New Hampshire'''s "all

lands submerged or f'lowed by mean high tide,"

N.H.

483-A.l-a (I) (Supp. 1973), imply a limit of

mean low water.

Connecticut, Conn.

(SUpp. 1975), and Rhode Island, R.I.

220-29(2)
2-1-14

(Supp. 1974), tie their limit to how far out
marsh plants can grow.

The more significant differences are in the
upper, inland boundaries.

Connecticut uses "one

foot above' local extreme high water" I New Hampshire

"three and one-half feet above local mean high "tide."
See note 182 infrA.
50 yards inland.

Rhode Island covers up to

,~note

9 supra.

Maine

Massachusetts imply a mean high tide line.

and

State

control, of land below the low water mark is clear -

control above that depends on the water law of the
particular state.

16.

J • .& M. Teal" 1ife

and Death of the

~l:t

Marsh,

2)9 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Teal]; CEQ, Second,
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supra note 6 at 2)8.
17.

Tripp, The Ecological, Importance' of a Salt Marsh

[hereinafter c.ited as Tripp], in Papers, supra
note 2 at 174.

18.

T~al

193.

19.

Id.

182-8), 200-01.1 Butman, in Papers, supra

note 2, at 163-64.

Tripp, in Papers l71-72

(Tripp uses a figure of 90%)1 CEQ, Second 236.
20.

Main,e Department of Environmental Protection,
Prot,ecting Your Coastal Wetlands. A Cit izen' s

Guide to the Wet1aQ4s
"

21.

Gannon, Constitutional

Law

5 (1974).

ImPlicat~Qns

of

Wetlang~

Legisla.tion. 1 Envir,onmental Affairs 654, 654-55
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gannon].

22.

"The sports fishery depends up«Yn the coastal estu-

aries even more than does the commercial fishery,
and much more money is involved ••.. [in 1965J four

million sports fishermen spent about

~our

hundred

million do11BrS on all aspects 01 their sport."
Teal 204.

23.

Teal 205-091 Tripp, in Paper§ 17).
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THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSg

II.

A.

The Evolution of the Present Legislation
and Legislatiye Findings

24.

Mass. ch, IJ1,

40 (1974), formerly ch. 1)0,

27A,

[1963J Mass. Acts & Resolves, ch, 426.
105 (1914).

25.

Mass. ch, 1)0,

26.

R,I.

2-1-13 to -17 (Supp. 19(4)

27.

R.I.

11-46.1-1 (Supp. 19(4)

28.

Me. tit. 12

4701-09 (1974), N.H.

483-AI 1-5

(Supp. 19(3).
29,.

Conn.

25-10 (Supp. 19(5).

30.

Conn.

25-7b to ... 7f (Supp. 19(5) .'

31.

Conn. 22a-28 to -35 (Supp. 1975).

32.

Mass. Canst. amend.

art. XLIX (Supp. 19(5). R.I.

Const. amend. XXXVII (Supp. 19(4).
of the

Massachuse~ts

The latest version

provision, adopted in 1972, states

that people have a right to "the na,tura1 ••. quali ties
,of their environment" and that t'he conservation ,of

natural resources is a pUblic purpose.

The new article

I, l7 of Rhode Island's constituti,on, adopted in 1970,

states thatt:he old "rights of fishery and the
priv1eges of the shore" continue and that it is
the duty of the legislature lito provide for the

-73-

c'onservation of the •.•.natural resources of the

state" and to provide adequa.te planning and regulation
"for the pr,eservation, regeneration and restoration
of the natural enviro·nment of the state."

)).

R.I.

2-1-1) (Supp. 1974).

There is also a general

s.tate'ment olf concern for the' environment in l1970]
R.I. Laws", ch. 162, the preamble to the legislation

setting up the Council of Environmental Quality.

R.I.

42-52-1 to -7 (Supp. 1974).

34 .

Conn.

22a-28 (Suprp. 1975)1.

35.

N.H.

483-A,1-b (Supp. 1973).

)6.

Me. tit. 12,

37.

Mass. ch. 130,

)8.

Me. tit. )8,
of this law

4701 (1974).
105, ch. 131,

40 (1.974).

481-88 (Supp,. 1973).
~

For a diseussion

Bosse1man, The Quiet

~eyo1utiQn,

§upra

note 7. at 187-204.

39.

Me. tit. 12,

4811-14 (1974),(Supp. 1974-75).

40.

Me. tit. J8 t 541-57 (Supp. 1973).

This act waS

held constitutional in Portland Pipe Line

~rp.

v.

Eqrironmental Improvement Common. 307 A.2d (1973).
the court finding, the state's power to regulate in
the need to preserve the environment.

41.

Connecticut Legislative Service 197.3,. P.A.. 7.3-562.
Passed in 1973, this act became ef£ective
February 1, 1975.
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42.

Mass. ch. 30,

43.

Mass., chI 130,

B.
44.

61~62

(Supp. 1975).

105 (1974).

Regulated Activities

Teal. supra note 17, at 2411 Counci] on Environmental Quality, First Annual Report 177 (1970
[hereinafter cite~ as CEQ. First].

45.

Conn.

22a-29(3), 25-10 (Supp. 1975). Me. tit. 12,

4'70Jl. (1974), Mass. chI 131, 4'0 (1974)
(Supp. 1973). R.I.
46.

Mass. ch. 130,

11~46.1-1

J

N.H.

48J-Asl

(Supp. 1974).

lOS (1974). Me. tit. 12,

4701 (1974).

Presumably the other states control the pollution
of wetlands in other, more general legislation.

47.

Conn.

2S-4a (Supp. 1975),.

This provision, whi'ch

allows the Commissioner of Environmental Protection
to establish lines beyond which such encroachments
may not extend, is primarily designed as a flood

control meaaure.
flood history,

The lines must be based on previous

25-4b (SUpp. 1975), and have no

relation to the extent of wetlands
48,.

R. I.

2-1-15 (Supp. 1974).

-'75-

C.

Permit Application Pr_ocedures

1.

49.

state versus local

authorit~

For simplicity flmunicipality" is used throughout

this paper to refer to the lOcal government bOdy
involved, regardless of its true title, except

where the powers of the actual unit are being disc,us,sed.

Some of the states g,lve a role to munlei'pal

bodies below the level of the chief executive
official.

50.

Conn.

22a-J2 (Supp. 1975), 'Mass. ch. 1)1,

40 (1974);, N.H.

U-8J-A.a4-a (IV) (Supp. 197),.

Conn.

-:33

22a-)2 to

(Supp. 1975h R.I.

46-17.1-2, 46-23-6(D) (b) (Supp. 1974).

11-46.1... 1,
Rhode ISland

appears to have created an overlapping authority
over dredge or fill permits between the Director
of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the

Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMe).

The

CRMC was set up in 1973, perhaps in response to the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act Of 1972, 16

U.S.C.A.,

1451-64 (1974,), to '"preserve, protect,

develop and, Where possible r restore the coastal
resources" of the state.

46.2)-1 (SuPP. 1974).

It consists of 17 members representing the legislature, coastal and non-coastal residents and
municipal officials I and the DNR.

They are appo,inted
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for varying terms by
offieials.

diffe~ent,

elected state

46-23-2 (Supp. 1974).

The CRMC is

given specific au-othority to issue permit,s for dredging
or filling

wetlan~s.

46-23-6(0)

(b)

(Supp.

1974)~

But curiously embedded in the criminal offences
,section,

11-17.1-2 (Supp. 1974,), is a provision

that the DNR issues permits f,or dredging or filling.

51.

Fo,r its normal!. funct i.ons of building dams and managing
reservoirs, the Water Resources Board
o~

(WR~)

consists

five directors appointed by the governor.

N.H.

481.J-4 (1968, Supp. 1973).

But for

"carrying out the provisions of law conferring
upon the water resources board authority to decide
mat~e~s

relative to resources of the state, including ••.

excavating, dredging and filling waters of the state,"
a special board, consisting of the members of the
\fRB, "the director of fish and game marine biologist

[sicJ, biologist for fisheries, commissioner of safety,
executive director of water supply and pollution
control oommission, chief aquatic biologist of the
water supply and pollution control c O1Qlissi,on , the
commissioner of highways', cODJDl'\8sioner of resources
and

economic development, director Qf the division

of parks, director of planning and research in the

division of economic development," has been set up.
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[1971] N.H. Laws, 'ch. :)29.

52.

N.H.

483-Aa4-a (IV) (Supp. 1973).

5).

The Board of Environmental Protection consists of 10
gubernatorial appointees - two each representing
manufacturing, municipalities, the public and conservation, and two persons "knowledgeable" about
air pollution - and the Commiasioner of Environmental
Protection.

361 (Supp. 1974-75),

Me. tit. 38,

This

composition was held to be reasonable and not arbitrary
in In Fe Maine Clew Fuels,. I[lp., 310A. 2d 736 (1973).

54.

Me. tit. 12,

55.

Mass. chI 1)1,

4702 (Supp. 1974).

40 (1974).

For a survey of other

state legislation and how it deals with this
lOcal issue, see Note, state

s~ate

-

Land Use Regulation -

A suryey of Recent Legislatiye Approaches, 56 Minn.
L. Rev. 869, 898-911 (1972).

56.

Conn.
N.H.

7-1)la (Supp. 1975>' Mass. chI 40,
36-Aal-6 (1971, Supp. 1973)

to ....4 (1971).
57.

Mass. chI 1)1,
(SuPP. 197J) '.

I

R.I.

8e. (1958}a

45-35-1,

CEQ, First, supra note 46, at 312-14.
40 (1974). N.H.

48J-Aa4-a (IV)

In New Hampshire the conservation

commission must notify the Water Resources Board
within 7 days of the filing of the original .appli-

cation with the Board

~f

it wants to delay the

Board's proceedings and make its own investigation.
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Ye~

the local commission must receive its copy of the

apPlication from the Town Clerk, with the result
that there is very little time for the commission to
act.

Since

483-A.2 (Supp. 1973) allows the Board

30 days Within which to have a hearing, the 7 day

time limit seems excessively short.
of

If the purpose

48J-a.4-a (IV), added in 1973. is to give local

communities a greater chance to participate in
permit decisions, the reservation 'of the pow.er to
delay only to the local conservatiDn commission,
Which may not even

e~ist, ~ather

than including the

mayor or town manager if there is no commission,
seems self-defeating.

Surely the municipality's

interest in being able to investigate an application
does fiot depend upon its having a conservatinn commission,

a~though

it may be that the change was designed

to encourage the formation of such commissions.

58.

Golden Vt

aQ~d

of

N.E.2d 57.3 (1970).

Select~,

358 Mass. 519,

~65

Some municipalities in Massachusetts

have imposed strict zoning regulations of their own for
wetlands preservation.
supra note 7, at 214.

Bosselman, The Quiet Reyolution,
One important case upholding

such zoning was Turnpike Realtv Co. y, Uedbam, 1972
Mass. Ad. She 1)03, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied,

409

u.s.

1108 (197'3), discussed in more detail in "text

-79-

at note 12'7 infra_

59.

Me. Tit. 12,

60.

Bosselman, The Quiet Reyo1ution 320.

2.

61.

4702 (1974).

Submission of the APplication

Conn. 22a-J2 (SuPP. 1975), Me. tit. 12,
Mass. ch. 1)1,

R.I.

40 (1914); N.H.

11-46.1-1, 46-17.1-2,

(Supp. 1974).

4701 (1974);

48)-A.1 (Supp. 1973);

46~2J-6(B),

(D) (b)

Unless otherwise specified Rhode

Island's legislation contains no detailed requirements for any aspect of the permit procedure
requirements described in the text and accompanying notes.
62.

~

note 48 supra.

Maine's procedures require the issuance or d·enial
lof a permit within the· 60 day period, but New
Hampshire's do not, raising the possibility that
work could legally commence before a decision
has been made.

That

reau,lt would seem to defeat

the purposes of the otherwise carefully worked
out legislative scheme of permit examination.

6).

Conn. 22a-J2 (Supp. 1975), Me. tit. 12, 4'701 (1974)
Mass. ch. 1)1.
R.I.

46~17'.1-·2

40 (1974) I N.H.
( Supp. :t974) •

J

48J-'A.2 {Supp, 197J)J
CCimnect iC.ut

allows
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public hearings to be waived if the Commissioner

of the Department of Environmental Protection
"determines that the regulated activit,y for which a
permit is sought is not likely to have a s,ignificant

impaot

Oil

the wetland," but he must put a notice

to that effect in the local newspaper, and if 25
people request a hearing he

~ust

have one.

The

New Ramps'hire statute gives the Water Resources

Board similar discretion, but without any provis:ion
for a group to overrule its deciSion.

Connecticut's

statute requiring permits for structures in tidal
coastal or

navi~ble

waters, Conn.

25-7b to -7f

(Supp_ 1975), has been held not, to require a public

hearing.

Bloom y,. Water Resources COM'n, 157 Conn.

528, 254 A.2d 884 (1969).

This holding was upheld

in HotchkiSS Gr9xe Ass'n .. y •. water Resources Comm'n,
161 Conn. 50,
oation that

282 A.2d 890 (1971), with the justifi-

~he

provision for a judicial appeal,

with a resulting hearing, was SUfficient.

64.

Maine's system of a relatively informal municipal
hearing was attacked as not necessarily providing
for the presentation of the state'S possibly adverse
interest and as not com;plying '-wi t,h due process
legislative requirements" because the Board of

Environmental Protection- s decision was made .1n

-81-

~amerij,

and no record was kept, of thepubli.c hearing

of the Board's deliberations.

Halperin, Consermtion

PQliey

and

]J8~40

(l971) [hereinafter cited as Halperin].

the Role of Counsel, 23 Me.L.Rev. 119,

The present policy of the Board, however, is to

conduct its own public hearing when there is

any

showing of pUblic interest in the application,
such as people writing the Board.

A full record is

kept and parti-cipants are allowed to be represented
Th.e Board's collect,ive deliberations

by counsel.

and

voting are pUblic.

Protection,

Department of Environmental

Regul~tiQns

for Hearings

on

ARplicati~DS

[Hereinafter cited as Maine, Regulations].

(1964).

The statutory language is ,at Me. tit. 38,

361

(Supp. 1974-75).

65.

Maine allows a municipality or the Board of
Environmental Protection to defer action on an
application beyond the normal )0 day period by up
to 120 days, if winter conditions prevent proper

evaluation of the ,application.

No work:. however,

may be done on the project in the

66.

me~time.

Me. tit. 12,

4701 (1974).

Conn.

(supp. 1,975) (15 days prior), Mass.

22a-32

chI 131,

40 (1974).

It may be that administr.ative

practice provides fair warning to the persons the

-82-

legis,lat'ion requires to be informed" but such a
requirement of basic fairness should be in the
legislation itself.
mental Protection

Maine's Department of Environ-

Reguli~ion§

does specify a 10 day

notice period.

67.

Connecticut is the only state not to list

th~

applicant specifically, but given the otherwise
careful and detailed provisions in Conn.

22a-32

(Supp. 1975), that seems an inadvertent oversight.

68.

Connecticut sensibly requires all the recipients
of applications to be notified.

Massachusetts

includes the municipal board of health and planning
board, although they do not receive copies of the
application.

69.

Mass. ch. 131,

Connecticut includes both, Maine and New Hampshire
only the former.

N.H.

70.

40. (1974).

New Hampshire's provision,

48j-!a 2-a (Supp. 1973), was first added in 1973.

Massachusetts, Department of Public Works. New
Hampshire, Department of Public Works and Highways.
the state Office of Planning and Research, Division
of Economic Development, Water Supply and Pollution
Control Commission and FiSh and Game Department.

71.

Only Rhode Is1and is silent, although New Hampshire's
requirement was only added in 197J.
2-a (Supp. 1973).

N.H.

483-AI

-8J-

72.

S'ee note 64 supre..

73.

Maine, Regu1itioDP.

4.

74.

Me. tit. 12,

75.

Conn.
Ma'6S.

The Decision

4702 (1974)1

22a-3) (Supp.

chI 131,

1975), Me. tit.

40 (1974); N.H.

(Supp. 19'73h R.I.

76.

Mass. chi 1)1,
12~

40 (1974).

4702 (1974).

483-A,4-a(III)

46-17.1-2 (SupP,. 19(4).

Such language would seem

~o er~ate

a bias in favor

of the existing use if the decision making body and
the adjoining owner wished to maintain it.

If develop-

ment were planned, that would clearly affect the
enjoyment of

neighbo~ing,

conservationist owners.

If one developer has another developer as a neighbor,

this ground for denial would not be available to the
decision maker.

77.

~

text at notes 127-141 intra.

5.
78.

Conn.

permit Conditions

2'2a-33 (SuPP.

1975); Me. tit. 1Z;

(1974) I Mass. chI 1)1,
4~1

40

(1974), ,N.H.

(III) (Supp. 19(3), R.I.

4702

48J-A.),

46-23-6(B) , (D)

( Supp. 19(4).

79.

Me. tit. 12,

4702 (1974).

If the permit is ,not

so recorded within 30 days it becomes void.
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80.

Mass. ch. 1.31,

~O

(1974). N.H.

48.3-A.4-b

'(Supp. 197.3).

81.

Me. tit. 12,

4702 (1974).

6•
82.

Enter cement

22a--J5 (SUpp. 1975) ('no mo:t'e than $1000)'1 Me.

Conn.

tit. 12,

4709 (1974) (no more than $500); Mass. ch.

IJ1,

40 (1974) (no more than $1000 and/or six months);

N.H.

48.3-AI 5,6 (SuPP. 1973) (no more than $5000 for

violation ,of order of Water. Resources Board" t'he proceeds to be used for restoration or wetlands research;
misdemeanor for 'violation of section by natura.!

person, felony by anyone else). R.I.

11-46.1~1

(Supp,

1974) ($500 for violation of s,ection, half to state,
half to co,mplainant I $50/day for violation ,of ot"der

of Directcor of Departme'nt of Natural Resources,),

46-17.1-1 (19(4) (no more than $1000 and/or one year).
Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Hampshire make

explicit the normal assumption that the Attorney
General is the official responsible for enforcing
~hese

8.3.

Conn.
(1974)

84.

provisions.

Co,nn,.

2'2a-J5 (Supp. 1975)
I

R.I.

I

Me. tit. 12,

4709

11-46.1-1 (Supp. 19(4),

22a-J3 (Supp. 19(5). H'.I. 46-17.1-2

(Supp. 19(4).

Rhode' Island' s provision only

-85'"

~pplies

and
is

to permits allowing the transporting

d~mping
~equired

of waste materials.

A state inspector

to oversee comp1i'ance with any

conditions.

85.

Co,nn.

22a-35 (Supp. 1975)( Me. tit. 12,

(1974)1 Mass. ch. 131,

40 (1974), N.H.

(Supp. 1973).
86.

110 (Supp. 1975). N.H.

Mass. chi 12,

7-18-a to c

(Supp. 1973).

87.

Mass. chi 131,

40 (1974).

88.

N.H.

(Supp. 1973).

89.

Me. tit. 12

90.

R.I.

483~AI4-b

J502-B (1974).

42-17.1-4(f) (Supp. 1974).

As of 1973 this

division. also enforces "all of the laws and regulations
of the department and the coastal resources

manage~ent

council."

9'1.

~

text at .note 73 supra.

7.

92.

Mass. chi 1]1,

Appeals and Relief

40 (1974).

original applicant; if

The municipality

anothe~

and

person is asking

the Department for a determination, are notified
of any such request and can presumably make their

views known.

the
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93.

~

94.

Conn.

95.

N.H.

96.

Conn.

note 64 supra.

4-166 to -184 (Supp. 1975) (within 10 days).

483-AI4(I)r )1. 74 (SuPP. 197).
22a-)4(a) (Supp. 1975) (Within JO days).

Me. tit. 12 r
N.H.

4704 (1974) (Within. 30 days) J

483-AI4(1), )1'74 (Supp. 1973) (within 20

days).

97.

Me. tit. 12.,

4704 (1974).

It reads.

"Appeal

may be taken ••• for the purpose of determining
whether the action

ap~ealed

from so restricts

the use of the property as to deprive the owner
of the reasonable use thereof or which constitutes
the equivalent of a taking without compensation."
The language does not give a conservation group

an opportunity to challenge the grantin& of a permit.

98.

Mass. ch. 30A,

1-17 (1966, SUpp. 1975), as

[1973] Mass. Acts & Re.solves, ch •. 1114 r
R.I.

99.

42-J5~1

Conn.

(1974);
100.

1-);

to -15 (1970).

22a-34(a) (supp. 1975). Me. tit. 12,
N.H.

~ended,

4704

483-AI4(II) (Supp. 1973).

Conn.

22a-J4(a) (Supp. 1975), damages to be awarded

under

*8-12 (Supp. 1975), N.H.

48J-AJ4(II)

(SuPP. 1973). damages to be assessed under
482.25-28

and 481110(II~III)

(1968).

New Hampshire

also specifically requires that "the public purpose
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standards of this chapter" be met.
The jUdicial decIsions regarding takings are
discussed beginning at note 116 infra.
D.
101.

Administratiye

Qrder~

4'754-56 (1974) I Mass. chi 130,

Me. tit. 12,
105 (1974).

102.

Mass. ch. 21,

2-2A (1973).

The Board controls

the Department of Natural Resources and consists
of 5 members, appointed by the Governor "with
due regard to ge,ographical di.stribution."

members are to be "qualified in the field

The
o~

natural resources or in the work of the department."
10).

This description of the Massachusetts procedure

has been taken from BosseLman, The Quiet Revolu~,

supra note 7, at 205-16.

104.

R.I.

46-2J-6(A) (Supp. 1974).

105.

~.

106.

16 U.S.C.A.

107.

Bosselman,

46-2)-6(B).
1451-64 (1974).
~h,

'Quiet Reyolytion

2 0 5,

~09.
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III.

A.
108.

JUDICIAL REJOINDERS

The Present S!aj;us

Brecciaro1i y. Commissioner of Enyironmental
Protectiqn, Conn.

L.J~

Vartela§ v. water

~esources

(Sup, ct.), Apr. 15, 1975.
Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650,

153 A.2d 822 '(1959) I Shorehayen Golf Club.

I~iJ

y, Water Resources COmm'n, 146 Conn. 619, 153

A.2d 444 (1959), Bykar Industrial Corp. y. Gill,

4 E.L.R. 20226 (Conn. SupeT. Ct. Dec. 11, 1973),
State y. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), Qommissioner of Natural Resources y.S. Volpe

349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
son
109.

v.

&

Co'.,

~~

State, 110 N.H. 8, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).

Brecci ar oli v. Commissioner of Environmental
Protection, Conn. L. J. (Sup. Ct.), Apr. 15, 1975;
Hotchkiss

GrQY~

Asa'n

v.

water Resources Comm'n,

161 Conn. 50, 282 A.2d 890 (1971), Blanev y. Bittal, )12 A.2d 522 (Me. 1973), In re Maine Clean

Fuels. Inc., )10 A.2d 736 (Me. 197); $tate y.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (iMe. 1970). COmmissioner of
Natural Resources

v. S. Volpe & Co., )49 Mass.

104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
110.

All states have constitutional pt-ovisions that
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any taking of private property for public purposes
must be' compensated.

Conn. Canst. art. I, 11

(1967), Me. Const. art. I, 21 (1965). Mass Canst.
Pt. 1, art. X (1958)1 N.H. Canst. Pt. I, art. XII

(1971); R.I. Const. art. I, 16 (1957).
of the historical background

~o

For some

these provisions

see F. Bosse1man, D. Callies & J. Banta,

~

Taking IssueJk An Analysis ot the Cpnstitutional
Limits of Land

Us~

Control,

82-104 (1973) [herein-

after cited as Bosselman, The Taking Issue].
111.

Delogu,

~he

Wetlan2s Decision 'Is Absurd, Maine

Times, June 12, 1970; at 8, col.l [hereinafter
cited as Delo,gu I], Gannon supra note 21 at 654,
Comment, _l'he Wetlands Statutes.

Regulation or

Taking?, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 64 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Conn. Comment]r Note, §tate and Local
Wetlands Regulatianl

The Problem _of Taking.

Without Just Compensation, 58 Va. L. Rev. 876

(1972) [hereinafter cited as Va. Note].,
112.

Some of the Ma,jor supreme Court cases are,.
Goldblatt v.

Hempste~d.

United States v. Causby,
Miller

Y.

Schoene, 276

u.s. 590 (1962)J
328 u.s. 256 (1946)J

369

u.s, 272 (1928), Pennsul-

vania Coal Co, y, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),

Hadacheck x, Sebastian, 239

U.s. 394

(1915);
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PQwel1 v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (l887);

Mugler v. Kansas, 123
113.

U.s. 623

For discussions of that history

(1887).
~

The Taiin~ Issue 105"'38, Michelman"

Bosse1man,
Property,

Unity and Fairness I

comments on the Ethical

FoundationS of "Just

CQmp~nsation"

Law, 80 Harv.

L. Rev. 1165, 118)-99 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman].

Sax, Takings ~d the Poli,e Po~,

74 Yale L.J. 37, 38-4) (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Sax I].
114.

Sax, TakiDaJI. Pri vat e Pr operty and Publi c Hi ght s ,

81 Yale L.J. 149, 149-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Sax IIJ.

115.

rg. 151. As sax points out this theory only
takes into account "the owners ability to profit
from the piece of property ••• considered bv itself.,
(emphasis in original)"

II

But in the case of

wetlands this standard is inadequate both because
it only looks at the diminution in value to the
owner and not to society at large, and because
the measure of loss is incomplete.
ment study concluded.

"The

va~ues

As one govern-

of the estuarine

zone as a fish and Wildlife habitat, as a recreational facility, and as an aesthetic experience
are perhaps greater than they are for commercial

exploitation, but unf'ortlUlately, we, have no,t

yet developed the ability to adequately
express these social and humanistic values in
quantitative terms."

United States Department of

Interior, water Pollution Control Administration.
The Ngiional

Estuarin~

Pollution Study

40 (1970).

116.

265 A.2d '7ll(Me. 1970).

117.

Gannon, supri note 21, at 654. Halperin, supra
note 64, at 1)1-)2. Waite, Public Rights in

Maine

WAters, 17 Me. L. Rev. 161 (1965).
118,.

151 Conn. 304, 19'7 A.2d 770 (1964) (restrictive flood

plain zoning struck down as confiscatory).
119.

265 A.2d at 715.

~20.

161 Conn. 24, 31, 282 A.2d 907, 910 (1971) (restric,tive

zoning of wetlands held confiscatory because of
extreme diminution in value).
121.

349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).

122.

265 A.2d at 715-16.

123.

[1963J Mass. Acts & Resolves, ch. 426, AS amended
Mass. 131,

124.

40 (1974).

349. Mass. at 111-12, 206 N.E.2d ,at 671-[72.
Among the qu.estions asked were.

1) what are

the uses of the property in its natural state,

both independent of any other land owne4 by the

developer and in conj'unction with s'uch land,
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2) what has been the property's assess,ed value

in the past, J) what Was the cost of the

prope~ty

to the owner, 4) what is the present fair market
val ue

0

f t he ,property, both with the res.tr i ct ions

in the permit and without them., 5) what are the
estimated costs of the proposed project, 6) would
there be a taking if the restriction prevented
the owner from

gett~ng

a fair return on a) his

investment. b) the fair maJ;'ket value wit'hout
restrictions, 7) is it revelant that the land
may have other uses, and 8) is it relevant that
the site is now not suitable for development?
125.

Bosselman, The Quiet Bevolution,

7, at 216 J Conn. CotnI!'lent"

~upra

note

supra note Ill, at 91.

~26.

Michelman, supra note 113, at 1166.

127.

1972 Mass Ad. Sh. IJ'O), 284 N.E. 2d 891,
denied, 409

u.s.

~.

1108 (1973).

128.

IS.

129_

146 Conn. 650, 15J A.2d 822 (1959).

1)0.

1972 Mass. Ad. Sh. at 1314, 284 N.E. 2d at 899.

1)1.

l,g.

at 1J08, 284 N.E. 2d at 896.

at 1315, 284 N. E. 2,d at 900.

One recent

case that did focus on the diminution in value

question in a way favorable to the preservation
of wetlands was Just y. Marinette County,

Wi.se. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972).

56

In upholding

-93-

the denial of a permit to fill an inland wetland,
the court said that "this depreciation of value
is not based on the use of land in its natural

state but on what the land would be worth if it
could be filled and used for the location of
a dwelling.

While loss of'

vah~e

is to be con-

sidered in determining Whether a restriction is a

constructive taking, value based upon changing
the character of the land at the expense of harm

to public rights is not an ,essential factor or
controlling."

56 Wisc. 2d at 23, 201 N.W. 2d at

771.
132.

284 N.E. 2d at 901-02.

133.

Conn. L.J. (Sup.

134.

M. 6

135.

148 Conn. 299, 170 A.2d 267 (1961).

lJ6.

Conn. L.J. (Sup. Ct.), Apr. 15, 1975, at 6.

137.

146 Conn. at 656, 153 A.2d at 825.

138'.

Conn. L.,J. (SUp. Ct.), Apr. 15 . 1975, at 6.

C~),

Apr. 15, 1975, at 4.

The situation was identical to the one in the
Johnson case, but whereas the Connecticut court
was willing to force the owner to try to find
a less harmful alternative, the Maine court was
not.

139.

lQ. 5.

140.

265 A.2d at 716; 349 Mass. at 106-7, 206 N.E. 2d
at 668-69.

The Johnson c'ourt, however, felt that

the public .should bear the costs of preservation.

More recently, in a case involving the site
development law, Me. tit. 38,
~

481-88 (Supp. 1973),

note )8 supra, the Maine C'ourt stat,ed I

"It

s,eems self-evident in these times of increased
awareness of the relationship of the environment
to human health

~nd

welfare that ••.• the. stat·e

may justifiably limit the use which .some own·ers

may make of their property.

O'ur law has long

a landowner holds his property

recognized that

sUbject to the limitation that he may not use
it to the serious disadvantage of the public.·'

In re Spring Valley Dey., 300 A.2d 736, 746

(Me. 1973).
141.

Council on Environmental Quali.ty, Fourth Annual
R'eport 143 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CEQ, Fourth].

u.s. 590

142.

)69

143.

Conn. L. J. (Sup., Ct.), Apr. IS, 1975, at 5.

144.

369

u.s.

at 594.

B.

145.

(l962).

Alternative Solutions

Conn. 26-17a (Supp. 1975);' Me. tit . .33,
(Supp. 1973); Mass. ch. 1)-2A,

668

3-3A 1(1974)

J

-95-

N.H.

J6-As6 (1971).

R.I.

32-4-2 to -15 (1969),

45-36-2 (1971).
146.

4 Nichols' l,aw of Eminent Domain

12.)14

(rev. 3d ed. 1974).

147.

There is little likelihood that present economic
conditi,ons in the New England states will allow
much room for wetlands acquisition in their budgets.
See Boston Sunday Globe, April 6, 1975, at 29,
col. 4-6.

148.

Conn. 26-17a (Supp. 1975). Me. tit. JJ,
(Supp. 1973); Mass. chI 184,

N.H.

667-68

3l-JJ (Supp. 1975).

36-A14 (1971).

149.

~

150.

De1ogu, Land Use Control Principles Applied ]"Q

text at notes 102-103 supra.

QIfshore Coastal Waters, 59 Ky. L.J. 606, 62)

(1971). Note,

Toe

Public Trust.

in

Tidal Areas I

A Sometime Submerged Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J.

762, '770 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note J.
151.

Hearings on L.D. 395 and L.D. 730 before the

~ine

Joint Committee on Natural Resources, l07t'h Le.g. ,
April 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Maine Hearings].
152.

Maine Hearings.

153.

Maine Hearings.
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C.

Arguments for Police Power Regulation
1.

Alternative uses of wetlands

154.

Halperin, supra note 64, at 123-25.

155.

Wilkes"

~gnstitutional

Dilemmas Posed by State

Policies Against Marine Pollution - The

Main~

Example, 23 Me. L. Rev. 14), (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Wilkes],
156.

Harris, Enyironmental RegulaDODsl Zoning
Withheld Municipal Services.

an~

Takings of Property

bx Multi-Government Action, 25 U. Fla. L, Rev.
635. 635-6 (1973).

157.

Bo~selman,

1he Taking Issue, supra note 110,

at 284-87.

2..

158.

The Nuisance Argument·

Sax II, supra note 114, at 150-55.

Sax goes

OD

to talk of the important case Where the harm
to neighboring property is too diffuse to be
measurable, and he discusses the need in such
situations for the public interest as a Whole
to be considered.

12. 155-60.

This point

will be consi4ered With What is called here the
'public trust argument, beginning at note 177 infra.
159.

See t,ext at note 2 supra.
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160.

Halperin 126-28.

Needless to say, this concession

hardly helped their position.
161.

CEQ" Foyrtb, supra note 141, at, 14-5-46.

162.

151 Conn. )04, 197

16).

~.

164.

265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).

165.

Wilkes, /su'Qra note 155 at 157.

166.

Sax II 169.

167.

Waite, Ransoming the Maine Enyironment, 2) Me.L.

A~2d

770 (1964).

at 311, 197 A.2d at 77).

Rev. 103, 117n.66 (1971).
168.

Id.

118 (footnote omitted), 118n.67.

169.

SQuth

~erminal

Corp. y. Enyironmental Protection

Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 678 (1974).

We may wish

to develop a system whereby the loss of development rights in one area can be compensated. for
by

giving new or expanded development rights

elsewhere, but this concept is still in its

infancy,.

~

ilagman, Book Review, 87 Hax'v. L. Rev.

482, 493-94 (1973).
170.

The particular importance of wetlands may give
them a special status in tnat property owners are
put on notice that they cannot

legitimate~y

expect

to use their land in such a way as to destroy

its usefulness to society.
204-06 ,infra.

~

text at notes
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171.

Note, Coastal Wetlands in New GJlgland. 52 B.U.L.
Rev.

724, 759-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as B.U.

Note ].
172.

Miller y. SchoeD&. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).

173.

Consolidated Rock Products v. Los AngeJ..u, 57' Cal.

2d 5,15, 370 P.2d ]42 (1962), appe'a! dismisged,

371 u.s.J6 (1962).
174.

,Mug1e; y.

1.75,.

Powell

176.

,~ee

KAJ1§as,

y.

12)

U. S. 623

PeoosylYania, 127

u.s.

678 (1887).

text at notes 198-99 infra.

3. The Public
177.

(1887).

Trust Argument

A number of commentators have suggested that the
public trust doctrine might be of use in arguing

that the regulation of wetlands is not a taking.
Bosse1man,

~he

Taking Issue, supra note 110, at

309-13; Wilkes, supra note 155, at 15)-54; Conn.
Comment, syp[a note Ill, at 96-97, Va. Note,
supra note Ill, at 895-99.

What follows is an

attempt to refine its application and to expand

the argument specifically in relation to the New
England coastal states.
178.

1 Waters and water Rights

37.2(c), at 208-09,

J6.J(B). at 192-9] (R. C,lark ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Clark].
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179.

Id.

37.4(A), at 213-17.

sell or give away its

While a state may

prop~ty,

no state has said

that' "the pUblic interest may be alien,at,ed in fee
to privat,e persons without regard to the utility
and need of the people for navigation, and

witho~t

assurance that the property will be used to promote at
least a quasi-public purpose" ••• " IJ1.
180.

Ch. 43"

H.. Henry

36.4(A), at 196.

of the Colonial Ordinance, quoted i.n 2
& D.

Halperin, Maine Law Affecting

Resources 189 (1969)

[hereinafte~

Marw

cited as Henry], reads I

"It is declared" that in all creeks, coves and othel'

places about and upon salt water, where the sea ebbs

and flows, the proprietor, or the land adjoining, shall
have propri,ety to the low water mark, where the sea
doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs further, prGvided that such proprietor
shall not by this liberty have power to stop or hinder
the passage of boats or other vessels, in or through
any sea, creeks or coves, to other men's houses or

lands."
181.

Commonwealth X, Alger, 61 Mass. (7 cusht') ,53
(1851) J Clark

36.3(C), at 193-94; Henry 188.

The ordinance applies to Maine Which was a
part of Massachusetts until 1820, even though
parts of Maine w,ere not under' the control lof the

-100-

Massachu$~tts

Bay Colony when the Ordinance was

The law in New Hampshire as to the

passed.

applicability of the Colonial Ordinance appears
somewhat unsettled, but the weight of what
autho~ity

there is favors its nonapplicability.

Certain parts of Rhode Island, originally belong-

ing to Massachusetts, may be sUbject to the
B.U. Note 731-'5.

Colonial Ordinance.

182.

The natural balance

poin~

as a wetland builds

i t'self up and is torn down by the elements is
about one foot above high water.

Above that

there is less grass and thus erosion; below,

sedimentation and growth.

Teal, supra 'note 16

at 61-62.
183.

"Foreshore" is used to mean the tideland between
the high and low water marks.

184.

Clark J6.4(B), at 200-02, Schoenbaurn, 'Public
Rights and coa§tal Zone

Managemen~,

51 NiC.L.

Rev. 1, 6-7, 16-17 (1972), Yale Note, supra
note 150, at 763-74.

185.

State y. KnOWles-Lombard QQ,
(1963')

I

122

C~nn,

26), 188 A. 275

Rochester y. Barney" 117 Conn. 462, 169 A. 45

(1933), R. Reis, connecticut Water Law.
Allocation

at

Judicial

Water- Resources 107·20 (1967) (herein-

aft,er cited as Reis].

Recreational rights include
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swimming and boating. "sea produce" rights include
flshing,shell"'fi,shing, and collecting s'ea weed

below the high water mark.
186.

Reis 131.

187.

146 Conn. 619, 153 A.2d 444 (1959) .

188,

21 Corm.. Supp,. 407 (Super. Ct. 1959) •

189.

4

190.

I,g. 20228..

E.L.R~

29226 (Conn. Super. ct . Dec. 11, 1973).

The opinion gave a very complete

description of' the functions of a wetland&

"As

hydrologic sponges they absorb, large amounts of
water during severe tides, thus containing the spread
of flood waters.

As balance wheels in the

ecosystem, they sop up excess nutrients for later
release when the nu"tri.ent supply is low.
men~ary

As sedi-

catch basins, they serve as natural deposi'"

tories for accumulations of sediment brought in
by the tide, thus keeping the channels free for
navigation.

As nurseries, they supply nutrients

to ,shell-.fish, crustaceans and other marine life.
As natural refuges they act as habitats for wild
I1fe and as a way station for migratory watert'owl.··

191.

146 Conn. at 625-26, 153 A.2d at 441.

192.

110 N.H. 8, 10, 259 A.2d 397, (1969).

193.

Conn.

194.

~

22a-29 (2) (SuPP. 1975).

E.L.R. at 20228.

-102....

195.

~

note 180 supra.

196.

The Mas'sachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court was clearly
interested in this issue as it asked counsel in
the Volpe case to consider on remand the relevance

of the Colonial Ordinance.

)49 Mass. 104, 112, 206

N.E. 2d 666, 672 (1956).
197.

Henry, supra note 180, at 2)6-40.

198.

Dver y. Curtis, 72 Me. 181, 184 (1881).

199.

lS.

200.

HenrY y. Newburyport, 149 Mass. 582, 585 (1889).

201.

Henry, supra note 180, at 190,

202.

Teal, supra note 16, at 196.

20).

S~e

204.

CEQ, Fourth, supra note 141, at 146.

205.

56 Wise. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).

at 186.

JOl~OJ.

p. 2 supra.

supra.

~

For a fuller discussion of the case

note 131
~

Harv. L. Rev. 1582 (1973).
206.

56 Wise. 2d at 17, 201 N.W. 2d at 768.

207.

151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1954).

208.

265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).

209.

56 Wise. 2d at

210.

86 Harv. L. Rev. 1582, 1582-1592 (1973,).

211.

CEQ, Fourth 146-47.

21~22,

201 N.W.2d at 770.

In Mugler, 123 U.S. 623

(1887), the brewery owners were not compensated
when the sale of beer was made illegal.

86

...10J-

212.

~

Maine's site development law, note )8 supra,

and In re Spring

V~11ey

Deye1oPlnent, JOO A.2!Q 7)6,

746 (Me. 1973), quoted! at note 140 supra.
21).

One court that has explici.tly recognized this fact
is the Qalifornia Supreme Court, which said in

~@rks

y.

Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 p.2d 374, )80 (1971).

"The public uses' to which tidelands are SUbject
are SUfficiently flexible to encompass changing

pUblic needs.

In administering the trust the

state is not burdened with an outmoded classifi...

cation favoring one mode of utility over another.
There is a growing public recognition that
one of the most important public uses'of the
tidelands - a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust ... is the preservati,on of these lands in their
natural state ••..
214.

n

(footnote ,omitted).

Henry, supra note 180, at 190-91, 2,74.
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I V,.

CONCLUSIONS

215.

See text at, note 151 supra.

216.

Although nominally

part~time,

tne Board of Environmental

Protection is a full-time body with a statutorily
mandated diverse membership,
217.

Mass. ch. 130, 105 (1974).

~

~

note 53 supra.
text at notes

102...103 supra.
218.

See text at note 101 supra.

219.

265 A.2d 71l (Me. 1970).

220.

300 A.2d 736 (Me. 197J)!

221.

1972 Mass. Ad. She l303, 284 N.E.2d 891, cert.

denied, 409

u.s.

1108 (1973).

222'.

Conn. L.J. (Sup. ct.), Apr. 15, 1975, at 4.

223.

16 U.S.C.A.

224.

~

225.

Testimony of Representative Morton, Maine

1451-64 (1974).

note 4 supra.

Hearings, supra note 151.
226.

Teal, supra note 16, at 200.

